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A popular myth holds that Hadley v. Baxendale1 was part of a judicial 
trend toward limiting the power of juries to award damages for lost profits.  
According to this myth, pre-Hadley juries exercised unlimited power to 
award plaintiffs the damages they had suffered on account of contract 
breaches and other wrongs.  One of the leading contracts textbooks goes so 
far as to say:  “Prior to 1854 [the date of the Hadley opinion] there were 
almost no rules of contract damages.  The assessment of damages was for 
the most part left to the unfettered discretion of the jury.”2 
 
* Robert M. Lloyd, Professor Emeritus, University of Tennessee College of Law.  Nicholas 
J. Chase, Shareholder, Egerton, McAfee, Armistead & Davis, P.C. 
The authors would like to thank Greg Stein and Tom Davies for helpful comments on earlier 
drafts.  
 1.  156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854). 
 2.  JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 14.5 (4th ed. 
1998).  See generally CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES 563-
64 (1935) [hereinafter McCormick Treatise] (“In short, apart from a few special rules for 
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The myth goes on to hold that the Hadley rule was necessary so that 
the industrial enterprises that were developing at the time would not be 
exposed to excessive damage awards if a plaintiff convinced a jury that the 
defendant’s breach had cost the plaintiff immense profits.  Even the 
eminent damages scholar Professor Charles T. McCormick said that the 
Hadley rule “harmonized well with the free-trade economic philosophy of 
the Victorian era during which our law of contracts became systematized.”3 
These myths fit nicely with the legal realist jurisprudence that was 
dominant in American legal scholarship for most of the twentieth century4 
(and even better with the critical legal studies jurisprudence that took the 
position that legal rules had developed as tools for maintaining the 
dominance of the entrenched elites).5  Because these myths appeared to 
confirm what most American scholars already believed,6 those scholars 
accepted the myths with without question.7 
 
particular types of agreements and some expressions to the effect that damages must be the 
‘natural’ or ‘necessary’ result of the breach, one who failed to carry out his contract was, so 
far as legal theory went, liable for any and all resulting loss sustained by the other party, 
however unforeseeable such loss might have been.”).  Accord 11 JOSEPH M. PERILLO, 
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 56.2 (rev. ed. 2005)(providing identical language in his edition on 
contracts); Charles T. McCormick, The Contemplation Rule As A Limitation Upon Damages 
For Breach of Contract, 19 MINN. L. REV. 497, 500 (1935) (containing similar language).  
See also Ralph S. Bauer, Consequential Damages in Contract, 80 U. PA. L. REV. 687, 687-
88 (1932) (“In all the cases prior to 1854, there seems to have been, on the whole, a fair and 
just determination of the issue of damages in each case, without the use of any even fairly 
distinct rule.  Each court merely applied its own notions of justice to the particular case 
before it, usually doing justice with only a vague statement of supposed law as to 
damages.”); HOWARD O. HUNTER, MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS § 14:10, Westlaw (database 
updated Mar. 2015) (“[T]he [Hadley] decision was a reaction to the virtually unbridled 
discretion of juries that had been the rule before the case.  The English judges wanted 
control over the award of damages by jurors who might be swayed more by emotion than by 
reason.”). 
 3.  MCCORMICK TREATISE, supra note 2, at 567.  
 4.  Legal realists romanticized the jurisprudence of the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth century courts as wise jurists dispensing justice as determined by the facts of the 
cases before them, unbound by legal dogma.  See, e.g., GRANT GILMORE, AGES OF 
AMERICAN LAW 36 (1977) (describing a “golden age” of American jurisprudence); see also 
KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 36 (1960) 
(describing a “Grand Style” of judging during this period). 
 5.  See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 71–-76 
(1984) (discussing competing interpretations of how the law developed as a tool for 
furthering the interests of the elite). 
 6.  See, e.g., Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in 
Many Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 175 (1998) (describing the tendency to give undue 
weight to facts that confirm preexisting beliefs and discount those that challenge such 
beliefs). 
 7.  There was in fact a counter-myth.  The counter-myth held that Hadley was 
important not because it limited the recovery of lost profits, but for the opposite reason—
that the prior law did not allow the recovery of lost profits and the Hadley decision changed 
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In fact, however, the law developed in quite a different way.  Roman 
law made the first steps toward allowing plaintiffs to recover lost profits in 
the third century B.C.8  As the Roman economy developed, these rules on 
lost profits became more sophisticated and went on to become the core of 
the damages rules for the modern European civil law.9  Anglo-American 
law took a different course.  Contrary to the myths, the common law had 
rigid rules limiting awards of damages, and common law judges held juries 
to these rules.10  But unlike the civil law rules, the common law rules made 
little allowance for the recovery of lost profits until a series of New York 
cases incorporated the civil law rules (as articulated by the French scholar 
Pothier) into American law years before the Hadley court famously relied 
on Pothier to postulate a rule already well known in America.11 
What is far more important than the fact that the Hadley rule actually 
migrated from the United States to Great Britain, rather than crossing the 
Atlantic in the other direction, is that the rule Hadley announced has 
become relatively unimportant as a limitation on damages.  Far more 
important in modern law is a rule that developed alongside the Hadley 
rule—the rule that damages in general and lost profits in particular can be 
recovered only if they can be proven with reasonable certainty.  This article 
will trace that rule, showing how it developed alongside the Hadley rule 
and ultimately overshadowed it. 
I. THE DEVELOPMENT UNDER THE CIVIL LAW 
A. Recovery of Lost Profits Under Roman Law 
The reasonable certainty requirement, like Hadley’s foreseeability 
 
the law to allow the recovery of these damages.  See, e.g., GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF 
CONTRACT 52 (1978) (“[T]he essential novelty of the Hadley formula . . . was its affirmative 
statement that . . . lost profits and other consequential damages caused by a breach of a 
contractual duty were recoverable.”).  The counter-myth is closer to the truth, but it is still 
wrong.  Contrary to what Gilmore and others said, as explained in Parts III-VI of this article, 
the law governing the recovery of lost profits developed independently of the Hadley rule 
for many years and by the time the Hadley rule became prominent, it was just a minor 
modification of a well-established body of rules.  
 8.  See infra notes 24-32 and accompanying text (discussing the movement toward a 
new legal institution).  
 9.  See infra notes 33-46 and accompanying text (describing the development of 
Roman law and the impact of legal scholars known as jurisconsults). 
 10.  See infra notes 72-82 and accompanying text (discussing that the law of damages 
was separate from contracts and was already an extensively developed concept and 
discussing how they should be calculated). 
 11.  See infra, Parts III-V (describing the additional cases that had a significant impact 
on damage recovery). 
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requirement, originated in Roman law.  Both became important when the 
law began to allow recovery for lost profits.  We do not know exactly when 
this began.  We do know, however, that the concept of recovery for lucrum 
cessans, or profits lost, was part of the Lex Aquilia,12 a plebiscite enacted in 
approximately 287 B.C.13  The Lex Aquilia was a compilation of private 
law dealing almost exclusively with tort recovery for damage done to 
“movable property.”14 
To understand why a 2,300 year-old law was such a legal landmark, 
we need to go back even further.  The Roman legal system, like most 
primitive legal systems, arose as a substitute for blood feuds.  The early 
Romans were organized on a clan basis and dealt with murder or injury to a 
member of the clan by taking revenge on the wrongdoer’s kin.  Early on, 
the Romans developed (or more likely borrowed from other peoples with 
whom they were in contact) a device to replace the blood feud—the 
composition.  Following a solemn ceremony, the wrongdoer made a 
payment of money or goods to the injured person or their kin.15  Originally, 
the essence of the payment remained retribution, but the composition was 
an advance because it was retribution in a form that involved fewer social 
costs.  More important than compensating the victim and their kin was 
making them see that the wrongdoer had also suffered and thus reducing 
the incentive for private vengeance.16  Gradually, the emphasis of this still 
crude but evolving legal system shifted from retribution to compensation.  
At first the compensation was a payment in the form of cattle, but later the 
payment was in money, but the system remained crude.  There was no 
attempt to measure the damage the injured party had incurred.  The 
payment was a fixed sum based on a schedule of wrongs.17 
As the Roman legal system became more sophisticated, the catalogue 
of rights and obligations became more complex, as did the rules of 
 
 12.  See José Alonso & Jakub Urbanik, Liability for Damage in Others’ Property in 
Classical Law: Lex Acquilia, Pauperies, Corruption of Slave, at 23, 
http://en.wpia.uw.edu.pl/files/Urbanik/romanlaw/10obligations_damnum2.pdf?short= 
[perma.cc/3KJH-ADPX] (last visited, Feb. 28, 2015) (providing a list of the different types 
of damages available for plaintiffs who suffer different types of injuries). 
 13.  See infra notes 25-33 and accompanying text (discussing Lex Aquilia which 
provided the first damages system). 
 14.  Jeremy Ross, An Economic Analysis of Aquilian Liability, 14 TUL. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 521, 528 (2006). 
 15.  MICHAEL E. TIGAR, LAW & THE RISE OF CAPITALISM 25-26 (2000); H.F. JOLOWICZ, 
HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF ROMAN LAW 162 (1952).  
 16.   Ross, supra note 14, at 527-28. 
 17.   See JOLOWICZ, supra note 15, at 174 (discussing that even as late as 450 B.C., 
approximately the time of the Twelve Tables, the law allowed punishment for the breaking 
of a limb by allowing the victim to inflict or have inflicted a similar injury on the perpetrator 
“‘if no agreement for compensation be made’”).  
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government.  These rules, however, had not been reduced to writing.  The 
plebeians believed (probably correctly) that the patricians were 
manipulating these unwritten rules to their own advantage, so the plebeians 
demanded that the laws be reduced to written form.  The patricians resisted, 
but in approximately 450 B.C., the laws of the Roman Republic were set 
out on twelve bronze tablets.18  These have become known as the Twelve 
Tables.  While the laws they contained were crude and relied on magic and 
ritual, not only in the creation of obligations, but also as an integral part of 
legal procedure, they nevertheless form the foundation for our modern legal 
ideas.  Our modern concepts of debt, contract, and civil wrongs can be 
traced to the Twelve Tables.19 
Their provisions for remedies show how crude the Twelve Tables 
were.  The penalty for the fracture of a bone was 300 asses20 if the victim 
was a free man, and 150 asses if he was a slave.21  For blows that did not 
result in serious injury, the penalty was 25 asses.22  Twenty-five asses was 
also the penalty for unlawfully cutting down a tree belonging to someone 
else.23  The size or the value of the tree did not matter; likewise the severity 
of the injury did not matter as long as it did not move the injury into a 
 
 18.   See id. at 11-12 (revealing that scholars do not agree as to how much of the story 
of the XII Tables is history and how much is myth, but the basic story is that the plebeians 
believed that the magistrates were manipulating the unwritten customary law of Rome to 
favor the patricians.  A tribune of the plebeians proposed that five men be elected to draw up 
a code of law so that plebeians could have concrete provisions they could point to when they 
thought their rights were being violated.  The patricians successfully opposed the project for 
eight years, and when they were finally forced to accede to the drafting of a code, they 
delayed it further by sending an embassy to Greece to study the laws of Solon).  Most 
scholars doubt the embassy actually went to Greece.  Some think it went to the Greek 
colonies of Sicily or the southern Italian mainland.  See, e.g., OLGA TELLEGEN-COUPEROUS, 
A SHORT HISTORY OF ROMAN LAW 20 (1993) (discussing how the original text of Twelve 
Tables was not preserved). 
Finally, in 451 B.C., ten elected magistrates drafted a code.  After the assembly ratified it, 
the code was inscribed on ten tablets that were then placed in the marketplace.  The 
following year the people decided the work was not complete.  They elected ten new 
magistrates, who in turn drafted more laws, had them ratified by the people and inscribed on 
two additional tablets.  JOLOWICZ, supra note 17, at 11-12. 
Accounts differ as to the material on which the laws were inscribed.  Livy says it was 
bronze. 
 19.   TIGAR, supra note 15, at 25. 
 20.  See Guide to Ancient Roman Coinage, LITTLETON COIN CO., 
http://www.littletoncoin.com/webapp/wcs/stores/servlet/Display%7C10001%7C10001%7C-
1%7C%7CLearnNav%7CGuide-to-Ancient-Roman-Coinage.html [perma.cc/354C-TQHA] 
(last visited Feb. 28, 2015) (discussing the as, the basic unit of coinage during the Roman 
Republic.  In the early republic, a loaf of bread could be purchased for ½ as and a liter of 
wine for 2 asses). 
 21.  JOLOWICZ, supra note 15, at 174.  
 22.  Id. at 174-75. 
 23.  Id. at 174. 
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different category.  The system gave the judge no discretion. 
As Rome evolved from a village-based agricultural economy to a 
commercial empire where traders and bankers played an important role, it 
outgrew the old legal system and new institutions developed.24  The first 
step toward the modern law of remedies came when the Romans began to 
award damages on the basis of the victim’s loss rather than a fixed 
schedule.  This began with the Lex Aquilia, the previously-mentioned 
plebiscite of approximately 287 B.C.25  Among other things,26 the Lex 
Aquilia provided what may have been the world’s first system of damages 
to base the victim’s recovery on the value of their loss, rather than on a 
rigid schedule. 
The first chapter of the Lex Aquilia provided:  “[I]f anyone 
wrongfully . . . slays a male or female slave belonging to another person, or 
a four-footed . . . animal, let him be condemned to pay the owner as much 
money as the maximum the property was worth in the year (previous to the 
slaying).”27  The third chapter contained similar remedies in the case where 
any person damaged other types of chattels “by wrongfully . . . burning, 
breaking or rending.”28  In the case of burning, breaking, or rending, 
however, the victim’s recovery was limited to the highest value within the 
30 days immediately preceding the damage.29  In any of these cases, if the 
defendant denied liability, the payment to the plaintiff was doubled.30 
The literal language of the Lex Aquilia allowed only the recovery of 
 
 24.  See TIGAR, supra note 15, at 27-28 (describing the growth in trade and the 
corresponding institutions that developed). 
 25.  One commentator gives its date as 286 B.C.  Ross, supra note 16, at 528.  Another 
says the Lex Aquilia is “of uncertain date, but certainly later than the XII Tables.”  
JOLOWICZ, supra note 14, at 173.  And still another says:  “The date of the lex Aquilia is not 
certain but what evidence there is points to 287 B.C. and there is no positive reason for 
assigning the statute to any other time.”  ALAN WATSON, THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS IN THE 
LATER ROMAN REPUBLIC 234 (1965) (footnote omitted).  He also expresses the belief that it 
was at least in part a codification of existing legislation.  Id.   
 26.  The Lex Aquilia is also notable because it did away with the need to fit the loss 
into one of the strict categories prescribed in the Twelve Tables.  It allowed a plaintiff to 
bring “an action in damnum injuria datum, literally ‘damage given without right.’”  Ross, 
supra note 14, at 528. 
 27.  As quoted at Ross, supra note 14, at 529. 
 28.  Ross, supra note 14, at 529 (quoting DIG. 9.2.27.5 (Ulpian, Edict 18), reprinted in 
BRUCE W. FRIER, CASEBOOK ON THE ROMAN LAW OF DELICT 6 (Bruce W. Frier trans., 
1989)). 
 29.  See W.W. BUCKLAND, A TEXTBOOK OF ROMAN LAW FROM AUGUSTUS TO JUSTINIAN 
585 (Peter Stein ed., 3d ed. 1963) (“[A]nyone who unlawfully damaged another’s property 
in respects not coming under the first chapter, by burning, breaking or destroying, was liable 
to pay him the value the thing had had within 30 days before.”). 
 30.  See Ross, supra note 14, at 529 (“[T]he amount of payment to the plaintiff doubled 
if the defendant denied liability. . . .”). 
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direct damages, but later interpretations allowed the plaintiff to recover his 
“interest” (interesse in Latin) in the wrongful act not having occurred.31  
From this developed the idea that the plaintiff could recover consequential 
damages.32  One 19th century publication gave examples of the earliest 
consequential damages allowed under Roman law:  “If one of a pair of 
mules, or of a team of four horses, or one of twins, or of a band of 
comedians, is killed, account must be taken not only of the value of the 
person killed, but also of the depreciation of the rest . . . .”33 
As Roman commerce developed, the law of Rome developed along 
with it, becoming very solicitous to the interests of merchants.34  
Eventually, the recoverable consequential damages came to include future 
profits the plaintiff lost because of the injury.35  Roman law then began 
dividing the damages into two categories:  damnum emergens (damage 
emerging), which were the direct damages suffered by the plaintiff, and 
lucrum cessans (profit ceasing), which were the profits that the breach 
caused the plaintiff to lose.36 
Like most of Roman law, these concepts did not come through judicial 
decisions or though legislation.  Instead they resulted from the work of 
legal scholars known as jurisconsults.  The jurisconsults (sometimes 
referred to simply as “jurists”) were scholars recognized as experts in their 
respective fields of law but without any direct legislative or judicial 
authority.  Their writings carried great weight, so much so that for a time 
during the second century A.D., “[T]he opinions of certain jurisconsults 
were binding on judges.”37  Much of the Roman law that eventually became 
 
 31.  See id. at 530 (describing how the plaintiff was restored to his rightful position in 
the defendant’s act not having occurred).  For more information, see infra, text and 
accompanying notes 37-39 (discussing the importance of the interpretations of Roman law 
by the jurisconsults). 
 32.  See Ross, supra note 14, at 530 (describing the increasing flexibility of damages 
available); see also JOLOWICZ, supra note 17, at 290 (noting that interpretations “going back 
at least as far as Labeo [who died c. 10 A.D.] allowed the plaintiff to include consequential 
damages as well . . . .”) 
 33.  W.F. HARVEY, A BRIEF DIGEST OF THE ROMAN LAW OF CONTRACTS 92 (1878).  
Anticipating the modern law of lost profits, the Romans allowed recovery under the Lex 
Aquilia only if the amount of the damages could be estimated in money.  See id. at 95 (“The 
damages must be capable of being estimated in money . . . .”); cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF CONTRACTS § 352 (1989) (explaining that damages are not recoverable beyond an 
amount proved with reasonable certainty). 
 34.  See TIGAR, supra note 15, at 27 (describing the laws that developed as Roman trade 
expanded). 
 35.  See BUCKLAND, supra note 29, at 588 (translating lucrum cessans to include profits 
the owner was prevented from gaining due to the injury). 
 36.  See id. (describing what jurists considered to be a part of the highest value of 
damages available).  
 37.  See JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ROGERLIO PÉREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW 
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the basis for the legal systems of modern continental Europe derives from 
the writings of the jurisconsults.38  This scholarly tradition continues to play 
an important part in the jurisprudence of civil law countries,39 and it is 
through the work of an 18th century successor to the jurisconsults, the 
previously-mentioned Robert Joseph Pothier,40 that much of our law on 
commercial damages came into the common law system.41 
B. European Civil Law and Pothier 
The Roman law-based legal system of modern Europe has its roots in 
Bologna, Italy in the late 11th century.  The first modern university 
developed at Bologna and its scholars made law, specifically Roman law as 
set out in Justinian’s Institutes, a major subject of study.42  Scholars from 
throughout Europe came to Bologna, learned Roman law, and returned 
home to establish universities where they themselves taught the Roman 
law.  In this way, they made Roman law a common law of continental 
Europe.43  In some parts of the continent (e.g., Germany), the principalities 
officially adopted Roman law, as taught at Bologna, as their governing 
law.44  In others there was no official recognition of the Roman law, but 
tribunals accepted Roman law as authoritative even though it was not 
binding.45  Thus, in one way or another, the law of Rome became the law of 
Western Europe.46 
 
TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 57 
(3d ed. 2007) [hereinafter CIVIL LAW TRADITION].  Professor Dawson notes that there is 
some doubt as to the correctness of the reports that the opinions of the jurisconsults were 
binding.  JOHN P. DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF THE LAW 109-10 (1968). 
 38.  See CIVIL LAW TRADITION, supra note 37, at 57 (crediting the Roman jurisconsults 
as the founders of “the preeminence of the scholar in the civil law tradition.”  One writer 
says that the jurists “could function rather like an informal but very real standing 
commission for law reform.”  J.A.C. Thomas, Roman Law, in AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL 
SYSTEMS 8 (J.D.M. Derrett ed., 1968). 
 39.  See CIVIL LAW TRADITION, supra note 37, ch. IX (discussing the scholarly tradition 
in civil law). 
 40.  See infra Parts III-V (discussing Pothier’s writings and their influence extensively). 
 41.  See infra Parts III and IV (discussing various cases regarding damages). 
 42.  CIVIL LAW TRADITION, supra note 37, at 9. 
 43.  See id. at 9-10 (describing how scholars who studied in Bologna spread the Roman 
civil law to their native countries and effectively made Roman civil law a basis of a 
common law of Europe). 
 44.  Id. at 10. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Id.  Although some English scholars studied at Bologna, Roman law had initially 
had little influence on English law.  By the time the Roman law began to have a significant 
influence on the continent, England had already developed its own intricate and quite 
different system of law.  For more information about English and Roman law, see DAWSON, 
supra note 37, at 34-35. 
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In France, Robert Joseph Pothier, a professor at Orleans, published a 
series of studies on Roman law.47  The most important of these was his 
Traité des obligations, a study of the Roman law of obligations (i.e., 
contracts and torts).48  The drafters of the Code Napoleon adopted Pothier’s 
work as one of their technical guides,49 and William Evans, a London 
barrister, translated it into English under the title A Treatise on the Law of 
Obligations, Or Contracts.50  Evans’s translation was first published in 
1806, and it quickly became a standard reference work for lawyers in the 
United States as well as for those in England.51 
With Roman law had come lucrum cessans.  Although lucrum cessans 
had been important in allowing merchants to recover lost profits in the 
commercial economy of the late Roman Empire, the agrarian economy of 
the Middle Ages provided little opportunity for medieval lawyers to use the 
doctrine this way.  They did use it however.  It served them as a vehicle for 
avoiding the usury laws.  This was not something new.  The Roman 
lawyers had come up with a clever legal fiction.  Prohibited from suing the 
borrower for interest on a defaulted loan, they sued under lucrum cessans 
to recover the “loss of profit . . . that could have been made with the money 
lent that is foregone[,]” and they combined this with a claim under damnum 
emergens for “the incurrence of costs in making the loan itself.”52 
Medieval lawyers built on this idea, and the device became so 
common that in 1176 Pope Alexander III wrote to the Archbishop of Genoa 
 
 47.  Compare TIGAR, supra note 15, at 218 (identifying the professor as Joseph-Robert 
Pothier), with Joseph M. Perillo, Robert J. Pothier’s Influence on the Common Law of 
Contract, 11 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 267 (2005) (calling him Robert Joseph Pothier). 
 48.  The Roman law of obligations was essentially the law of in personam rights.  For 
every right there was a correlative duty.  According to Professor Barry Nicholas, “The 
[Latin] term obligatio denotes sometimes the right, sometimes (like the English ‘obligation’) 
the duty, but more properly, it denotes the whole relationship.”  BARRY NICHOLAS, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 158 (1962).  The great Roman jurisconsult Gaius divided 
obligations into two categories:  ex contractu (those arising from contract) and ex delicto 
(those arising from delict).  See id. (describing the two types of obligations that Gaius 
classifies).   
 49.  See TIGAR, supra note 15, at 218 (stating how Pothier’s work survived due to its 
adoption as a technical guide). 
 50.  See Perillo, supra note 47, 11 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. at 270 n.22 (noting that this 
is a truncation of the French title).  An earlier English translation, first published in the 
United States, was not widely distributed.  See id. at 270 (describing a little-known edition 
in 1802).  
 51.  See id. (describing how the 1806 edition was widely disseminated).  Not everyone 
is impressed with Pothier’s work.  Professor Dawson describes it as “a shallow but readable 
statement that for some persons, strangely, still has charms.”  Dawson, supra note 29, at 
350.  
 52.  Brian M. McCall, Unprofitable Lending: Modern Credit Regulation and The Lost 
Theory of Usury, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 549, 590 (2008) (footnotes omitted). 
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denouncing the practice: 
You tell us that it often happens in your city that people buy 
pepper and cinnamon and other wares worth at the time not more 
than five pounds, promising those from whom they received 
them six pounds at an appointed time.  Though contracts of this 
kind and under such a form cannot strictly be called usurious, yet, 
nevertheless, the vendors incur guilt unless they are really 
doubtful whether the wares might be worth more or less at the 
time of payment.  Your citizens will do well for their own 
salvation to cease from such contracts.53 
As a scholar of medieval economics points out, the justification for 
enforcement of the promise to pay six pounds is that “the trader is . . . 
entitled to recompense for the probable loss of profit,” and therefore the 
pope’s letter “consequently constitutes a recognition of the title lucrum 
cessans.”54 
What is more important is that recent scholarship has shown that our 
modern rule allowing lost profits to be recovered only if they can be proven 
with reasonable certainty also has its origin in the jurisprudence of lucrum 
cessans: 
[Beginning in the 13th Century,] [l]ucrum cessans as foregone 
profits was sometimes claimed by lenders of monetary capital 
who wished to collect interest on their loans and thus needed to 
avoid the charge of usury.  They had to prove that in lending 
funds they forewent a real and certain opportunity of profiting by 
having invested their capital in a given project.  Two corollaries 
follow from that: 
1) The lender (businessman or entrepreneur) in question must . . . 
claim, with certainty, a given amount of foregone profits as a 
result of a lost economic opportunity and/or 
2) The businessman or entrepreneur exercising the claim must 
operate in the framework of a stationary/traditional society.  This 
has to be the case in order to: 
a) calculate with certainty the value of lost profits.  This would 
only be possible, assuming the absence of monopoly (itself a very 
improbable and unlawful market structure), were there to obtain a 
stationary or steady state economics system. 
b) postulate the nonexistence of a competitive environment.  
 
 53.  Quoted in O’Brien, An Essay on Medieval Economic Teaching, 
FREEFICTIONBOOKS,   
http://www.freefictionbooks.org/books/e/8417-an-essay-on-mediaeval-economic-teaching-
by-obrien?start=83 [perma.cc/UQ9J-W3CP] (last visited Feb. 28, 2015) (footnotes 
omitted).  
 54.  Id. 
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Obviously, were that not the case, competition would make it 
impossible to calculate with certainty a given foregone volume of 
profits.55 
In other words, recovery of lucrum cessans required a level of proof that 
could be obtained only where the lender held near-monopoly power.  If he 
did not, a 13th century court would not permit recovery because it was not 
certain that profits had been lost.  But, if the lender was able to meet the 
burden of proof, he could recover interest on the money he lent by claiming 
that the interest was merely profit that the money could have made if it had 
been invested elsewhere.56 
The damnum emergens/lucrum cessans dichotomy was carried 
forward into the civil law and into international commercial arbitration, in 
both of which areas it continues to play an important part.57 
II. THE COMMON LAW DEVELOPMENT 
A. The Role of the Jury 
The common law principles of damages developed in quite a different 
way.58  The earliest development was similar to that of the Roman law, 
with a rigid system of compensation emerging to replace the blood feud.  
Before the Norman Conquest, the Anglo-Saxon peoples developed a 
schedule that set the price at which a wrongdoer was required to make bot, 
or compensate his victim.  Professor McCormick’s treatise on damages 
contains an extensive list from the Law of Ethelbert, who reigned at 600 
 
 55.  Antonio Jorge and Jorge Salazar-Carrillo, Lucrum Cessans, Damnum Emergens 
and the Market Place, JOURNAL OF FORENSIC ECONOMICS 4(1) 117, 117 (1990) (emphasis in 
original).   
 56.  See id. (explaining the concept of foregone profits). 
 57.  See, e.g., Sapphire Int’l Petroleums, Ltd. v. National Iranian Oil Co., 35 I.L.R. 136 
(1967), 13 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 1011 (1964) (explaining that compensation for breach of 
contract included the loss in the form of damnum emergens, and the lost profit in the form of 
lucrum cessans.); SERGEY RIPINSKY & KEVIN WILLIAMS, DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW 106 (2008) (stating that the lucrum cessans/damnum emergens dichotomy 
has been “followed in countless international arbitration awards”), quoting Himpurna v. 
PLN, Final Award of 4 May 1999, (2000) XXV Yearbook of Commercial Arbitration 13, 70 




%20emergens&f=false) [perma.cc/9PVZ-CEXM ] (last visited Feb. 28, 2015). 
 58.  Curiously, even though the Romans ruled Britain for 350 years, the Roman law had 
no discernible effect on the early English law.  For an interesting discussion of the possible 
reasons, see generally David A. Thomas, The Disappearance of Roman Law from Dark Age 
Britain, 1984 BYU L. REV. 563 (1984). 
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A.D.  If the wrongdoer struck out an eye, the bot was 50 shillings; for 
striking off an ear, it was only 12.  Knocking out a front tooth cost 6 
shillings, but a molar was worth only a single shilling.59 
The royal courts established after the Norman Conquest generally did 
not have such specific rules, nor were what rules they had so uniformly 
followed, due to the fact that most rules were common law rules rather than 
statutes.  This has led scholars to conclude that tribunals had considerable 
discretion in the award of damages.  The most extensive study of the 
history of contract damages says:  “Until the close of the eighteenth 
century, the Courts almost never discuss the principles by which the 
quantum of recovery is to be estimated.  The inquiry is not ‘How much 
shall be given?’ but rather, ‘Who shall make the assessment, and who 
correct a finding alleged to be erroneous?’”60  As discussed below, this is 
likely an overstatement.61  The lawyers of the day were so focused on 
procedure that the contemporary case reports probably neglected to 
mention the substantive issues of damages that were actually argued. 
The first provisions for correcting erroneous damages assessments 
were crude in the extreme.  Beginning in the late thirteenth century, a 
defendant who felt the damages assessed against him were excessive could 
apply for the writ of attaint,62  which would result in the convening of a 
grand jury of 24 knights, who would re-try the case.  If they issued a 
finding of faux serement, not only would the original verdict be annulled, 
but, more importantly from the point of controlling the jury, the petty jury 
that returned the verdict would suffer a punishment that strikes modern 
readers as entirely out of proportion to the offense:63  They could be 
imprisoned for an indefinite time, suffer forfeiture of all their chattels, have 
their houses razed, their meadows plowed up, and their trees extirpated.  If 
this was not enough, they could be condemned to perpetual infamy.64 
Attaint appears to have been seldom if ever granted for insufficient 
damages,65 so there must have been considerable pressure on jurors to keep 
 
 59.  MCCORMICK TREATISE, supra note 2, at 22. 
 60.  George T. Washington, Damages in Contract at Common Law, 47 L. Q. REV. 345, 
346 (1931).  
 61.  See infra notes 64-65 and accompanying text (discussing how jurors exposed 
themselves to potentially devastating punishment for flawed damage awards). 
 62.  See Washington, supra note 60, at 346-47 (explaining the procedures and potential 
results when a defendant sought a writ of attaint). 
 63.  Id. at 346-47. 
 64.  Harold J. Berman & Charles T. Reid, Jr., The Transformation of English Legal 
Science: From Hale to Blackstone, 45 EMORY L. J. 437, 468 n.59 (1996). 
 65.  Washington, supra note 60, at 349.  One article describes attaint as “an 
extraordinarily complicated and rarely used procedure.”  Berman & Reid, supra note 66, at 
468.  Still, the possibility of this extreme punishment must have weighed heavily on the 
jurors. 
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the award as small as possible.  The plaintiff awarded insufficient damages 
may not have been without a remedy, however, because it appears to have 
been the practice to allow such a plaintiff to obtain a non-suit and then sue 
again.66 
By the seventeenth century, attaint seems to have died out.67  In its 
place, courts began to control the award of damages by the grant of a new 
trial in cases where the damage award offended the judge’s sense of justice.  
Until 1670, however, it appears to have been the practice to fine the 
original jury whenever a new trial was awarded.68 
During this time, the courts seem to have employed narrow rules for 
estimating the damages in the limited types of cases for which such rules 
were feasible.  McCormick says: 
By the end of the [eighteenth] century it was clear that in 
England the courts would grant a new trial if the award violated 
some rule of damages—such rules were few and still chiefly 
confined to contracts—or if even in tort cases the court, in its 
discretion, considered the amount unreasonable. 
 
Parallel with the widening of the court’s power to set aside the 
award was the growth of the practice by the judges of guiding the 
jury in advance toward a finding of damages in accordance with 
consistent standards.  This is a chapter in legal history which has 
not as yet been written, but we know the charge or instruction of 
the judge was a feature of jury trials from the first.  The amount 
of damages was a “fact,” as to which the judge would have at 
first offered suggestions merely; but, as standards of damages are 
gradually worked out for the different forms of action, 
particularly the contract actions, the advice takes on the tone of 
instruction.  We may be sure that this practice of advising the 
jury upon the measure of their award, even more than exercise of 
the power to change or set it aside, provided the main vehicle for 
the formulation of the rules and standards of damages.69 
Most writers, however, have claimed that until Hadley was decided in 
1854, juries had unfettered discretion in awarding damages in contracts 
cases.70  The Calamari & Perillo textbook that was quoted at the beginning 
 
 66.  Washington, supra note 60, at 353. 
 67.  Id. at 350. 
 68.  Id. at 359. 
 69.  MCCORMICK TREATISE, supra note 2, at 27-28.  
 70.  See supra note 2 and accompanying text (providing examples of the common view 
among legal scholars that juries enjoyed largely unlimited discretion in awarding damages 
in pre-Hadley England). 
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of this article is one such source.71  Richard Danzig, in his famous article on 
Hadley v. Baxendale, takes a similar position.  He notes that Chitty’s 
treatise on contracts, then the leading English authority on the subject, 
hardly discussed the question of damages at all.  He says that Chitty’s only 
comment on damages in the ordinary run of cases was:  “When the parties 
have not furnished the criterion of damages by stipulating for a liquidated 
sum to be paid as such, it is, in general entirely the province of the jury to 
assess the amount, with reference to all the circumstances of the case.”72 
What Danzig and other scholars who have commented on the dearth 
of discussion of damages in contracts treatises overlook is that eighteenth 
century lawyers did not consider the rules of damages for breach of 
contract to be part of the law of contracts.  Damages was considered a 
separate subject.  Even as late as the early twentieth century, Langdell’s 
contracts casebook did not contain Hadley v. Baxendale (or any other 
damages case).73 
The truth is that by 1847 the law of damages was so extensive that 
Theodore Sedgwick, a Massachusetts lawyer, could write an extensive 
treatise on the subject.74  In his Introduction, Sedgwick quoted Lord 
Kaims’s 1767 English treatise Principles of Equity as saying:  “Damages 
are taxed by the jury, who give such damages, as in conscience they think 
sufficient to make up the loss, without regarding any precise rule.”75  
Sedgwick then went on to say:  “It is superfluous to say, that no such 
arbitrary discretion is now tolerated, except in a very limited class of cases, 
if indeed, in can be properly said to exist at all.”76 
Later in his treatise, Sedgwick said: 
[I]t is now well settled that in all actions of contract, subject to 
the exception [for breach of promises of marriage], and in all 
cases of tort where no evil motive is charged, that the amount of 
compensation is regulated by the direction of the court, and that 
the jury cannot substitute their vague and arbitrary discretion for 
the rules which the law lays down. 
 
 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Richard Danzig, Hadley v. Baxendale: A Study in the Industrialization of the Law, 
4 J. LEGAL STUD. 249, 255 (1975) (quoting J. CHITTY, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW 
OF CONTRACTS 768 (4th ed. 1850)). 
 73.  See E. Allen Farnsworth, Contracts Scholarship in the Age of Anthology, 85 MICH. 
L. REV. 1406, 1443 (1987) (providing examples of early casebooks on contract law that did 
not include some of the most influential damages cases).  Although Hadley was often 
included in damages casebooks, it did not appear in any contracts casebook until 1931. Id. 
 74.  THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES (1847). 
 75.  Id. at 2 (quoting HENRY HOME (LORD KAIMS), PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 78 (2d ed. 
1767)). 
 76.  SEDGWICK, supra note 74, at 2. 
ARTICLE 2 (LLOYD-CHASE) (DO NOT DELETE) 2/16/16  2:09 PM 
2016] RECOVERY OF DAMAGES FOR LOST PROFITS 329 
 
It is, in fact, indispensable that it should be so:  the measure of 
damages is the gist of the remedy; the remedy is no part of the 
facts of the cause, while, on the other hand, it so completely 
controls the rights of the parties, that if any absolute discretion be 
given the jury over the amount of compensation, the power of the 
court over questions of law, would be most emphatically a barren 
sceptre.77 
A review of the cases shows that Sedgwick was right.  Virtually every 
important American contract damages opinion from the decades 
immediately preceding Hadley indicates that the court gave the jury 
explicit instructions as to the way damages were to be calculated.78  
 
 77.  SEDGWICK, supra note 74, at 214-15.  
 78.  See, e.g., Bush v. Canfield, 2 Conn. 485, 488 (1818) (upholding jury instructions 
on measure of damages); Bridges v. Stickney, 38 Me. 361, 371 (1854) (granting a new trial 
where jury instructed damage calculations could be included with losses on collateral 
contract); Miller v. Mariner’s Church, 7 Me. 51, 56 (1830) (upholding jury instructions 
denying recovery of losses which claimant could have avoided); Willey v. Fredericks, 76 
Mass. 357, 360 (1858) (upholding instruction that jury could take into account loss of use of 
land in determining damages for breach of agreement to build sea wall); Fox v. Harding, 61 
Mass. (1 Cush.) 516, 522-23 (1851) (upholding jury instructions denying profits on 
collateral contracts); Lord v. Strong, 6 Mich. 61, 68-69 (1858) (upholding jury instructions 
that damages for breach of contract to carry lumber by ship were difference between 
contract price and price of freight on day cause of action accrued); Morrison v. Lovejoy, 6 
Minn. 319, 354 (1861) (granting new trial because jury instructions failed to instruct jury 
rent of mills should have been taken into account in calculating lost profits); Davis v. 
Talcott, 14 Barb. 611 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1853) (relating detailed instructions given to the jury, 
explaining what items could be included in the damage calculation and how lost profits were 
to be calculated); Driggs v. Dwight, 17 Wend. 71, 74-75 (N.Y. 1837) (upholding jury 
instructions allowing tenant to recover cost of moving); Deyo v. Waggoner, 19 Johns. 241, 
243 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1821) (reversing jury verdict because it improperly included 
consequential damages).  
In Thompson v. Shattuck, 43 Mass. 615 (1841), the defendant breached a contract to 
contribute to the maintenance of a mill dam.  The trial judge instructed the jury to calculate 
separately the two claimed items of damages:  the defendant’s share of the cost of the 
repairs and the profits lost while the repair was delayed.  The jury did as instructed, but the 
appellate panel held that only the cost of the repairs was allowable as damages. 
A Maine case, White v. Oliver, 36 Me. 92 (1853), involved a suit for failure to pay for the 
construction of a house.  The defendant claimed the house had not been finished and that the 
construction that was completed had not been completed according the specifications.  The 
court instructed the jury that the plaintiff “was entitled to receive for the house only the 
balance that would remain, after deducting from the contract price as much as it would cost 
to make the house what it should have been by the contract.”  Id. 
In another Maine case, Furlong v. Polleys, 30 Me. 491, 494 (1849), a jury verdict was set 
aside and a new trial granted because the jury instruction, which specified the damages for 
the nondelivery of hay were the difference between the contract price and the market price, 
did not specify the place at which the market price was to be determined.  
Cf. Walrth v. Redfield, 11 Barb. 368, 371 (N.Y. 1851) (awarding new trial because trial 
judge had given improper jury instructions as to damages where defendant’s dam caused 
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Blanchard v. Ely, discussed infra in Section III, and Masterton v. Brooklyn, 
discussed infra in Section IV, are just two examples.  In a case that reached 
the United States Supreme Court in 1852, two years before the Hadley 
decision, the plaintiff had requested eleven separate jury instructions, each 
pertaining to a separate item of damages.79  It is not clear how long 
American judges had been instructing juries on the damages they were 
allowed to award, but there is evidence of such instruction from the first 
reports of the newly independent American states.80 
 
injury to plaintiff’s mill, and indicating that in the absence of fraud, gross negligence, or 
wantonness, the same damages rules apply for tort as for contract). 
 79.  See Philadelphia, Baltimore & Wilmington R.R. v. Howard, 54 U.S. 307, 319-20 
(1852) (reviewing a prior case in which the plaintiff requested eleven separate jury 
instructions). 
 80.  Groves v. Graves, 1 Va. (1 Wash.) 1 (1790) was the first officially-reported case of 
the Supreme Court of Virginia.  The court reversed a jury verdict that awarded damages for 
the failure to deliver settlement certificates, the value of which had declined drastically.  The 
Supreme Court ordered a new trial because the jury had valued the certificates as of the date 
of trial, rather than as of the date they should have been delivered.  Id. at 3. 
In some cases, it appears that the courts were actually looking to the jury to develop a rule 
of law that would be a binding precedent in future cases.  For example, in 1804 Supreme 
Court Justice Washington, while riding circuit, tried a case in which an agent for a seller of 
goods delivered the goods to the buyer without receiving payment, apparently in violation of 
express orders.  Justice Washington charged the jury: 
The next question is, as to the damages?  I admit the principle, that in cases 
sounding in damages, the amount of damages depends upon the sound 
discretion of the jury.  In cases, where merely vindictive damages are sued for, 
the jury act without controls on this subject; because there is no legal rule by 
which they can be measured; and unless they are so extravagant as to induce a 
suspicion of improper conduct, the court will not interfere.  But in these cases, 
where a rule can be discovered; the jury are bound to adopt it.  That rule is, that 
the plaintiff shall recover so much, as will repair the injury sustained by the 
misconduct of the defendant; and applying this rule in the present case, what 
other measure of damages can be thought of, but the sum lost to the plaintiff by 
the violation of his orders?  The sum demanded, is of no great consequence, 
perhaps, to either of the parties, on the score of its amount.  But the question 
itself is important to the commercial interests of this country; in its intercourse 
with foreign nations.  A precedent is to be set to determine in a case like this, 
whether an agent is liable for a breach of orders and to what amount. 
Walker v. Smith, 29 Fed. Cas. 56 (Cir. Ct., D.Pa. 1804) (emphasis supplied).  When the jury 
awarded the plaintiff what the reporter of decisions said was “a sum much inferior to the 
loss he had sustained,” Justice Washington overruled the plaintiff’s motion for a new trial.  
Id.  The reporter paraphrases him as saying “that although he was not satisfied with the 
verdict, nor should he have assented to it as a juror, yet the question of damages, or of 
interest in the nature of damages, belonged so peculiarly to the jury, that he could not allow 
himself to invade their province . . . . ”  Id.  It is worth noting that while Justice Washington 
alluded to the broad general principle of awarding the amount that would make the plaintiff 
whole, the use of these broad principles did not come into vogue until a half century later 
(see infra note 176 and accompanying text), so he was looking to the jury to make a narrow 
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rule for determining the damages to be awarded when an agent delivered goods without 
authority. 
When the South Carolina Supreme Court upheld a compromise verdict in a case involving 
the value of a debt denominated in continental currency, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
read the opinion as creating a precedent requiring similar compromises in all such cases.  In 
Pledger v. Wade, 1 Bay 35 (1786), Pledger had executed a promissory note to Ely Kershaw 
& Co. in the amount of 818l. 19s. 9d.  In February, 1780, Wade contracted to acquire this 
note and return it to Pledger, but the note was held in Charleston and before Wade could get 
possession of the note, the British invested Charleston, and it became impossible for Wade 
to perform. Id.  The courts did not then recognize the doctrine of impossibility (See Berman 
& Reid, supra note 66, at 462-63 (noting that “the risk of impossibility due to unforeseen 
contingencies is placed on the lessee, in the absence of express terms to the contrary”)) so 
Wade was liable on his contract.  The issue was the amount of damages. 
The opinion does not say so explicitly, but from the context of the case, it seems clear that 
the note in question was payable, not in pounds sterling, but in bills of credit issued by the 
state of South Carolina and also denominated in pounds, shillings, and pence.  For most of 
their existence, these bills (which were not backed by specie) traded at approximately seven 
South Carolina pounds to one pound sterling.  See JOHN J. MCCUSKER, MONEY & EXCHANGE 
IN EUROPE & AMERICA (1600-1775) 220-26 (1978) (reporting the rate of exchange of South 
Carolina pounds to sterling).  To finance its participation in the Revolutionary War, 
however, South Carolina, like most states (and the Continental Congress), began issuing 
huge quantities of this fiat money.  The combination of the increase in the amount of state 
currency in circulation and the prospect that it might become valueless if the revolution 
failed caused the currency to depreciate precipitously.  See id. (describing the depreciation 
of South Carolina currency during the Revolutionary War).  In 1783, South Carolina 
enacted a Depreciation Act setting the value in specie that would have to be paid to 
discharge a debt incurred during the inflationary period April 1777 through May 1780.  It 
contained a month-by-month table setting the ratios of specie to paper currency. 
Pledger’s counsel argued that because the note in question had been issued before the period 
covered by the Depreciation Act, Wade was liable for the principal amount of the note plus 
the interest that had accrued on it through the date of the Pledger-Wade contract (287l. 11s. 
8d.). 1 Bay 35, at 35. Wade’s counsel argued that the debt on which the suit was based was 
the obligation to procure the note, and that had been incurred when the contract was 
executed, making the obligation subject to discounting under the act.  1 Bay 35, at 36.  
While today we would probably consider the issue a question of law for the court, this court 
treated it as a question of fact to be decided by the jury.  1 Bay 35, at 36.  
On that issue, the jury returned a compromise verdict.  They awarded the principal sum of 
“38l. 18s. 5d., the amount of money as depreciated in February, 1780 [the time the contract 
to acquire the note was made].”  But it awarded interest in the amount of 71l. 2s. 9d.  This, 
the reporter described as “interest on the nominal sum contended for [i.e., on the 287l. 11s. 
8d. face amount of the note.]”  
The South Carolina Supreme Court refused to order a new trial, issuing a per curiam opinion 
that read in full: 
As this is a case sounding in damages, and as the jury have thought proper to 
give a kind of equitable verdict between the parties; and as this also appears to 
be a hard case, we are against granting a new trial. 
1 Bay 35, at 37. 
But unlike later scholars, (see, e.g., Horwitz, infra note 89, 87 HARV. L. REV. at 926 (citing 
Pledger v. Wade as an example to demonstrate judges’ tendency to leave damage questions 
to the jury)) contemporary courts did not read this opinion as giving free rein to juries to 
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It is probably true that English judges were less likely to instruct the 
jury on the measure of damages than were American judges, but the few 
cases cited for the proposition that English juries had unfettered discretion81 
do not really support this.  For example, in Waters v. Towers,82 the 
defendants breached a contract by failing to set up the gearing for a bobbin 
mill in a timely and workmanlike manner.83  The owners of the mill were 
awarded damages of 14l. for their apprentices being unemployed and 133l. 
for the lost profits on an oral contract to supply bobbins to a firm consisting 
of two of the three plaintiffs.84  While this opinion does show the court 
upholding an award of lost profits on a collateral contract, something that 
American courts were still a few years from doing, and while it also shows 
the court upholding an award that might not have passed the Hadley v. 
Baxendale test, the report does not show that the jury’s award exceeded the 
amount supported by the evidence, nor is there any indication the jury was 
not instructed on the rules of expectation damages.  The case report 
consists almost entirely of the statement of the facts, the procedural history, 
and the argument of the defendants’ barrister.  The only opinion is a per 
curiam “The rule [nisi of the lower court] must be absolute.”85  The only 
other statement of the judges quoted in the opinion is Baron Alderson’s 
statement that the plaintiff’s testimony as to the oral contract to sell 
bobbins would have been sufficient evidence of the amount of the loss.  
Even this seems to have not been made in response to an argument 
concerning the amount of the damages, but in response to an argument that 
the contract to supply bobbins could not be the basis for a damages award 
because is was not in writing.86 
 
assess whatever damages they thought appropriate.  The New Jersey Supreme Court cited 
Pledger v. Wade for the proposition that “when a bond was not wholly paid off, all 
payments of continental money, so far as they affect the principal, are to be liquidated 
according to the tables of depreciation; but in the payment of interest, it is to be taken as to 
its nominal value.”  Executors of Todd v. Parker, 1 N.J.L. 54, 55 (1791).  So in refusing to 
overturn a jury verdict, the South Carolina court in effect created a rule for calculating 
damages that would be binding on later juries.   
 81.  See, e.g., Larry T. Garvin, Disproportionality and the Law of Consequential 
Damages, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 339, 347 n.31 (1998) (citing several cases in support of the 
proposition that courts gave juries substantial discretion). 
 82.  155 Eng. Rep. 1404 (Ex. 1853). 
 83.  Id. at 1404. 
 84.  Id. at 1405. Remaining consistent with the cited sources, the authors have 
deliberately chosen to refer to the Pound (unit of damages) as “.” 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  See id. at 1405. (“If a person undertakes to make a certain article for another, and to 
deliver it to him on a particular day, but fails to do so until a year afterwards, it would be 
most unreasonable that the latter could not recover any damage because the contract was not 
in writing.  The existence of a contract is evidence of the probable amount of loss sustained. 
Suppose the plaintiffs had said, ‘We should have made such and such a contract if the 
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B. The Reluctance of American Courts to Award Lost Profits 
To understand the way the law of lost profits developed in the United 
States, we need to understand the jurisprudence of the early nineteenth 
century.  American lawyers of that time were not concerned with broad 
general principles from which the rule for a specific case could be derived.  
Instead, they adhered to narrow precedents that articulated specific rules for 
specific situations.  Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.  described American law as 
late as 1864 as “a ragbag of details.”87 
We can put the blame on Blackstone.  American legal thinking of that 
time derived primarily from Blackstone.88  In Blackstone’s time, and for 
many centuries leading up to that time, the English social structure was 
based on ownership of real property.89  So to Blackstone, law was all about 
property rights.90  And because the stability of the society depended on 
property rights, Blackstone was very focused on black-letter rules.91  These 
 
defendants had performed theirs,’ and the jury believed the plaintiffs would have done so, 
that would surely have been evidence of the amount of loss occasioned by the defendant’s 
breach of contract.”) 
 87.  Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Taming the Tort Monster: the American 
Civil Justice System as a Battleground of Social Theory, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 12 (2002) 
(quoting OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Introduction to the General Survey, in COLLECTED 
LEGAL PAPERS 298, 301 (1881)). 
 88.  See, e.g., William D. Bader, Some Thoughts on Blackstone, Precedent, and 
Originalism, 19 VT. L. REV. 5, 5-9 (1994) (discussing Blackstone’s tremendous influence on 
early American legal thought); Robert C. Berring, Legal Research and the World of 
Thinkable Thoughts, 2 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 305, 308 (2000) (“[Blackstone’s] 
Commentaries became the cornerstone of American law”); Rustad & Koenig, supra note 89, 
68 BROOKLYN L. REV. at 13 (“Colonial America imported Blackstone’s vision of the 
common law.”). 
 89.  See David A. Thomas, Anglo-American Land Law: Diverging Developments from 
a Shared History, Part I: The Shared History, 34 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 143 (1999) 
(detailing the development of English real estate law). 
 90.  See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 2 (1766) 
(“There is nothing which so generally strikes the imagination, and engages the affections of 
mankind, as the right of property . . . .”). 
Professor Horwitz has written: “To modern eyes, the most distinctive feature of eighteenth 
century contract law is the subordination of contract to the law of property.  In Blackstone’s 
Commentaries contract appears for the first time in Book II, which is devoted entirely to the 
law of property.  Contract is classified among such subjects as descent, purchase, and 
occupancy as one of the many modes of transferring title to a specific thing.  Contract 
appears for the second and last time in a chapter entitled, “Of Injuries to Personal Property.”  
In all, Blackstone’s extraordinarily confused treatment of contract ideas occupies only forty 
pages of his four volume work.” Morton J. Horwitz, The Historical Foundations of Modern 
Contract Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 917, 920 (1974).  
 91.  See Stewart E. Sterk, Intellectualizing Property: The Tenuous Connections 
Between Land and Copyright, 83 WASH. U. L. Q.  417, 419 n.4 (2005) (“Blackstone, in both 
his judicial opinions and his commentaries, contributed significantly to the conception of 
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were not the broad general rules that guide our jurisprudence today.  They 
were narrow rules designed to cover specific situations.  As one writer put 
it, “the common law he was talking about was a hodge-podge of local 
practice and custom.”92  In 1847, Sedgwick apologized for the disjointed 
organization of his treatise on damages, explaining that convention dictated 
following Blackstone’s scheme of organization: 
In preparing the work, my chief embarrassment has arisen from 
the difficulty of making a proper and scientific division of the 
subject.  The whole arrangement of our Anglo-American 
jurisprudence . . . [is] so purely arbitrary and technical, that it is 
almost impossible to prepare a treatise on a subject as extensive, 
as that of the measure of damages, which shall be at once useful 
and logically arranged.  To be useful, it must, to a very 
considerable extent, (at all events,) conform to those arbitrary 
divisions which are altogether independent of any scientific 
analysis, and very frequently are directly in conflict with logical 
order.  Conscious of the difficulty, yet seeing no mode to avoid it 
altogether, I have endeavoured as far as possible, to make my 
treatment of the subject correspond with that which Blackstone 
adopted, and which subsequent writers on our law have generally 
followed.93 
Foremost among these “subsequent writers on our law” was 
Chancellor James Kent, whose Commentaries on American Law, first 
published in four volumes in 1825-30, came to overshadow Blackstone in 
shaping American law.94  Like Blackstone, Kent set out specific rules that 
applied only in specific situations.  For example, Kent did not have a 
chapter on the rules of contract law.  Instead, he had one chapter for the law 
of contracts of sale of personal property, one for the law of contracts of 
bailment, among other types of contracts.95 
None of these rules contemplated the award of lost profits, except to 
the extent that the damages formula gave some sort of recovery that would 
approximate the profits.  For example, where a seller failed to deliver the 
goods contracted for and the buyer had paid no part of the purchase price, 
the damages were the difference between the contract price and the market 
 
property as rigid and rule-laden.”).  
 92.  Berring, supra note 90, at 308. 
 93.  SEDGWICK, supra note 74, at 2-3. 
 94.  See McGrane Coxe, Chancellor Kent at Yale (Part II), 17 YALE L.J. 553, 562 
(1908) (quoting Story’s dedication of his treatise on conflict of law to Kent:  “You have 
done for America what Mr. Justice Blackstone in his invaluable commentaries has done for 
England.”). 
 95.  2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW vi-ix (6th ed. 1848). 
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price at the time and place the goods were to be delivered.96  This is 
basically the rule under the UCC, except that the UCC contemplates 
additional incidental and consequential damages.97  But if the buyer had 
paid the purchase price in advance, some of the case law held that the 
damages were the difference between the contract price and the highest 
market price of the article between the time of the contract and the time of 
trial.98 
Kent’s narrow rules so frustrated Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., who 
edited the twelfth edition of the Commentaries, that he groused that Kent 
“has no general ideas except wrong ones . . . .”99 
Justice Joseph Story’s opinion in The Lively100 was the second major 
cause of American courts’ failure to award damages for lost profits.  The 
case arose during the War of 1812 when the owners of a merchant ship 
sought to recover the profits they lost when a privateer improperly delayed 
their vessel.101  Story, who, in addition to being an Associate Justice of the 
United States Supreme Court, was the most respected legal scholar of the 
time,102 heard the case when he was riding circuit.  The opinion he wrote 
was, like many of his opinions, eloquent and full of common sense.103  
After reviewing the applicable case law and finding no authority awarding 
lost profits in similar situations, he went on to say: 
Independent however of all authority, I am satisfied upon 
principle, that an allowance of damages upon the basis of a 
calculation of profits is inadmissible.  The rule would be in the 
highest degree unfavorable to the interests of the community.  
 
 96.  See Shepherd v. Hampton, 16 U.S. 200, 204 (1818) (holding that the measure of 
damages in a breach of a contract of sale is the price of the article at the time it was to be 
delivered). 
 97.  U.C.C. § 2-713 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2012). 
 98.  See id. at 480 n.a. (noting that Sedgwick had criticized Kent’s earlier edition for 
having overlooked this distinction.  Kent replies that:  “These commentaries are not 
calculated to embody all of the nice, or arbitrary, or fanciful distinctions that are to be met in 
the reports.  I do not regard the distinction alluded to as well founded or supported.”  Id.  In 
this, Kent seems not to be guilty of the ultra-narrow rules and slavish adherence to precedent 
of which he has been accused). 
 99.  GILMORE, supra note 6, at 160-161 n.14 (quoting M. HOWE, JUSTICE OLIVER 
WENDELL HOLMES—THE PROVING YEARS (1870-1882), at 16 (1963)). 
 100.  15 Fed. Cas. 631 (C.C. D. Mass. 1812). 
 101.  Id. at 632. 
 102.  Lord Campbell, later to become Lord Chancellor of England, said that Story was 
“greater than any law writer of which England could boast . . . since the days of 
Blackstone.”  Quoted at Gerald T. Dunne, The American Blackstone, 41 WASH. U.L.Q. 321, 
322 (1963). 
 103.  For a contrary view, see Karl Llewellyn’s criticism of Story’s opinion in Swift v. 
Tyson, 16 U.S. 1 (1842).  KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING 
APPEALS 414-21, 428 (1960). 
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The subject would be utter uncertainty.  The calculation would 
proceed upon contingencies, and would require a knowledge of 
foreign markets, to an exactness in point of time and value and 
would sometimes present embarrassing obstacles.  Much would 
depend upon the length of the voyage, and the season of arrival, 
much upon the vigilance and activity of the master, and much 
upon momentary demand.  After all, it would be a calculation 
upon conjecture, and not upon facts.104 
Other courts shared their reluctance to award damages.105  They based 
their refusal to award lost profits on two forms of analysis, sometimes 
using one, sometimes using the other, and sometimes using both.  One form 
of analysis simply carried on Justice Story’s argument made in The Lively 
and looked at the facts of the particular case to hold that the uncertainties 
inherent in the venture meant that any profits that would be made were 
purely speculative.106  The other analysis stemmed from the previously 
described jurisprudence of the time that attempted to find a mechanical 
formula to govern every case so that the element of human judgment would 
be removed completely from the calculation of damages.  Courts applying 
the latter form of analysis (if that term may be applied to this mechanical 
jurisprudence) combed the precedents, looking for a rule that would govern 
the damages calculation.107  None of these rules allowed the court to do 
what a modern court would do and simply look at how much better off the 
plaintiff would have been if the defendant had fulfilled its legal 
obligations.108 
Justice Story himself combined the two bases for denying lost profits 
in another opinion regarding privateering matters, The Amiable Nancy:109 
The probable or possible benefits of a voyage, as yet in fieri, can 
never afford a safe rule by which to estimate damages in cases of 
marine trespass.  There is so much uncertainty in the rule itself, 
so many contingencies which may vary or extinguish its 
application, and so many difficulties in sustaining its legal 
 
 104.  15 Fed. Cas. at 634-635. 
 105.  See, e.g., Larabee Flour Mills Co. v. Mo. Pac. Rwy. Co., 116 P. 901, 902 (Kan. 
1911) (relying on an old principle that profits are not recoverable); Jones v. Van Patten, 3 
Ind. 109, 112 (Ind. 1851) (affirming award profits lost on flatboat trip down Mississippi 
River on procedural grounds, but expressing doubt that the trial court had correctly applied 
the damages rule, stating that reliance damages should have been awarded instead). 
 106.  See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text (allowing, in the case of an oral 
contract, plaintiff’s testimony as sufficient evidence of the amount of the loss). 
 107.  See, e.g., Blanchard v. Ely, 21 Wend. 342, 345-346 (N.Y. 1839) (demonstrating a 
court’s combing of precedents). 
 108.  Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS, supra note 35, at § 347 (providing that 
damages are measured by the injured party’s expectation interest). 
 109.  16 U.S. 546 (1818). 
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correctness, that the court cannot believe it proper to entertain it.  
In several cases in this court, the claim for profits has been 
expressly overruled; and in Del Col v. Arnold, (3 Dall 333.) and 
the Anna Maria, (2 Wheat. Rep. 327.) it was, after strict 
consideration, held, that the prime cost or value of the property 
lost, at the time of loss, and in the case of injury, the diminution 
in value, by reason of the injury, with interest upon such 
valuation, afforded the true measure for assessing damages.  The 
rule may not secure complete indemnity for all possible injuries; 
but it has certainty and general applicability to recommend it, and 
in almost all cases, will give a fair and just recompense.110 
Sedgwick discussed the tendency toward narrow rules with 
mechanical formulas in his 1847 treatise on damages,111 a treatise that 
became a classic and went through nine editions over the next seventy-
three years.112  Sedgwick complained about the narrow precise damage 
rules of American law113 and quoted a passage in which Justice Story 
compared treatises on the common law with their civil law counterparts, 
saying that the former “contain little more than a collection of the 
principles laid down in the adjudged cases, with scarcely an attempt to 
illustrate them by any general reasoning” while the civilians “discuss every 
subject with an elaborate theoretical fullness and accuracy, and ascend to 
the elementary principles of each particular branch of the science.”114 
In fact, one can get an idea of the way the law of damages evolved 
simply by studying the table of contents of Sedgwick’s treatise as it went 
through its many editions.  For example, in the 1847 edition, there are 
entire chapters devoted to rules for particular types of transactions, 
including chapters titled “Rule of Damages in Actions Brought for Breach 
of Real Covenants,” “The Measure of Damages in Actions Growing Out of 
the Contract of Principal and Surety,” “Rule of Damages as Between 
Principal and Agent,” and “The Rule of Damages in the Action of 
Trover.”115  There is a chapter containing general rules for tort damages, 
but it takes up only nine pages of this 600-page work.116  The general rules 
for contract damages get slightly better treatment, being given thirty 
pages.117 
 
 110.  Id. at 560-561. 
 111.  SEDGWICK, supra note 74, at 2-3. 
 112.  See THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES (rev. ed. 
Arthur G. Sedgwick & Joseph H. Beale, Jr. 1920). 
 113.  SEDGWICK, supra note 74, at 2-3. 
 114.  Id. at 5 (quoting Joseph Story, Pref to Com. on Bailments). 
 115.  See SEDGWICK, supra note 74, at ix-xiii (listing these chapters of the treatise). 
 116.  Id.  
 117.  Id.  
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In contrast, the eighth edition of the same work, published in 1891, 
looks more like a modern work on the subject, organizing its discussion not 
on rules in particular types of cases but on broad general principles.118  It 
begins with a “General View of the Subject,” which contains, among other 
things, a history of Anglo-American damages law and a summary of the 
damages rules of other legal systems.119  It then devotes an 88-page chapter 
to a discussion of general principles of compensation in damages 
jurisprudence.120  An eighty-nine-page chapter on Consequential 
Damages121 is followed by a chapter on Certain and Uncertain Damages 
(i.e., the rule that damages must be proven with reasonable certainty).122  
There are also chapters on Avoidable Consequences,123 The Measure and 
Elements of Value,124 Exemplary Damages,125 Liquidated Damages126 and 
other topics, most of which would be of interest to modern readers.127 
But in the jurisprudence of the early nineteenth century, there was no 
room for general rules about lost profits.  In fact, there was little room for 
the general rule that damages should be whatever makes the plaintiff 
whole.  Instead, there were myriad, narrow rules.  If profits were lost 
because the defendant breached its contract to sell goods, the plaintiff’s 
recovery was via the rule for the sale of goods.  If the plaintiff lost profits 
because the defendant breached a lease, the recovery was determined by 
the rules for breach of leases. 
III. BLANDCHARD V. ELY – THE CASE THAT ANTICIPATED HADLEY 
V. BAXENDALE  
In 1839, New York’s Supreme Court of Judicature, then the state’s 
highest court, used a new theory to deny recovery of lost profits.  
Blanchard v. Ely128 was a suit to recover the unpaid balance of the $12,500 
price to be paid for the building of a steamboat to ply the Susquehanna 
River between Oswego and Wilkes-Barre.129  The defendants claimed 
 
 118.  THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES (8th. ed. Arthur 
G. Sedgwick & Joseph H. Beale, Jr. 1891). 
 119.  See id. ch. I. (listing the sections under the first chapter of the treatise). 
 120.  See id. ch.II. (Compensation). 
 121.  See id. ch. IV. (Chapter III is devoted to situations when only nominal damages are 
awarded). 
 122.  See id. ch. V. (Certain and Uncertain Damages). 
 123.  See id. ch VI. (Avoidable Consequences). 
 124.  See id. ch. VIII. (The Measure and Elements of Value). 
 125.  See id. ch. XI. (Exemplary Damages). 
 126.  See id. ch XII. (Liquidated Damages). 
 127.  See, e.g., id ch. VII (expenses of litigation). 
 128.  Blanchard v. Ely, 21 Wend. 342, 342 (N.Y. 1839). 
 129.  Id. at 342-43. 
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offsets because the boat the defendants delivered had defects that not only 
required repairs, but also required that the defendants cancel planned trips, 
causing them in turn to lose profits of $100 per trip.130  The trial judge 
instructed the jury that they should deduct from the unpaid price the cost of 
repairing the defects, but not the lost profits.131  Addressing the propriety of 
this instruction, Justice Cowen,132 writing for the Supreme Court, said: 
No common law authority was cited at the bar, one way or the 
other, having any direct application to the measure of damages in 
such a case as this; nor am I aware that any exists.  If there be 
none, it is somewhat singular, considering the many contracts for 
building boats and other vessels which must have been made in 
England and this country.133 
While it strikes the modern reader as strange that the court would not ask 
whether lost profits were generally recoverable, but would instead look for 
a case of lost profits in a boat-building contract, this search for a narrow 
rule based on the type of transaction involved was still the norm in 1839. 
Finding no boat-building cases, the court did go further afield and 
looked at cases involving breach of warranty in the sale of real estate.  
There, the court cited one of its earlier opinions that in turn echoed the 
reasoning of Justice Story in The Lively:  “it would be ruinous and 
oppressive to make the seller respond in damages, for any accidental rise in 
value of the land or the increased value in consequence of the 
improvements made by the purchaser.”134  The court then went on to quote 
still another of its own opinions, saying that “[t]he safest rule is, to limit the 
recovery as much as possible, to an indemnity for the actual injury 
sustained, without regard to the profits the plaintiff has failed to make.”135  
After discussing similar analogous rules with respect to sales of chattels, 
the opinion proceeded to break with tradition and consider a rule of general 
application: 
In short, it will be seen by the cases cited and many more, that on 
the subject in question, our courts are more and more falling into 
the track of the civil law, the rule of which is thus laid down by a 
learned writer:  “In general, the parties are deemed to have 
contemplated only the damages and interest which the creditor 
might suffer from the non-performance of the obligation, in 
 
 130.  Id.at 343. 
 131.  Id. at 344. 
 132.  See LLEWELLYN, supra note 105, at 64-68, 423-26 (praising Cowen as one of the 
masters of what Llewellyn called the “Grand Style” of opinion writing). 
 133.  Blanchard, 21 Wend. at 345. 
 134.  Id. at 346 (quoting Dimmick v. Lockwood, 10 Wend. 150 (N.Y. 1833)). 
 135.  Id. (quoting Baldwin v. Munn, 2 Wend. 399, 406 (N.Y. 1829)). 
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respect to the particular thing which is the object of it; and not 
such as may have been accidentally occasioned thereby in respect 
to his own affairs,” 1 Evans, Poth. 91, Lond. ed. 1806.  He 
illustrates the rule by the rise of value in goods which the 
promisor fails to deliver.  He adds, if the lessor’s title to a house 
fails, he is bound to pay to his lessee the expense of removal, and 
indemnify him against the advance of rents, but not against the 
loss of custom in a business he may have established while 
residing in the house.  He also adverts to the distinction that the 
vendor may, notwithstanding, incur liability for extrinsic 
damages of the creditor, if it appears they were stipulated for or 
tacitly submitted to in the contract.  One instance is that of 
stipulating to deliver a horse in such time that a certain advantage 
may be gained reaching such a place.  There the debtor shall, on 
default, pay for the loss of the advantage.136 
This is not only the reasoning of Hadley v. Baxendale,137 articulated 
fifteen years before the Court of the Exchequer’s opinion in Hadley,138 but 
it is the same authority (William Evans’s translation of Pothier’s Traité des 
obligations) that Baron Parke so forcefully put forward early in the oral 
arguments in Hadley.139  If things had gone differently, Blanchard v. Ely 
 
 136.  Id. at 348. 
 137.  Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854). 
 138.  The Supreme Judicial court of Maine articulated the same rule even earlier, saying: 
 
In general [in cases of breach of contract] the delinquent party is holden to make 
good the loss occasioned by his delinquency.  But his liability is limited to 
direct damages, which, according to the nature of the subject may be 
contemplated or presumed to result from his failure.  Remote or speculative 
damages although susceptible of proof, and deducible from the 
nonperformance, are not allowed. 
 
Miller v. Mariners Church, 7 Me. 51, 55 (1830).  The case has rather picturesque facts.  The 
plaintiff was the warden of the state prison.  He brought the action against the trustees of a 
church for the price of hammered stone (presumably rocks broken by the convicts) delivered 
for use in a new church building.  The trustees counterclaimed for damages for late delivery 
and defects in workmanship. Id. at 51.  
Later courts (including the United States Supreme Court) frequently cited the opinion, not 
for the Hadley rule, but for the rule that a plaintiff may not recover damages that could have 
been avoided without undue burden.  See, e.g., Pullman’s Palace Car Co. v. Metropolitan 
Street Rwy. Co., 157 U.S. 94, 111 (1895)(citing Miller for the proposition a plaintiff may 
not recover damages that could have been avoided without undue burden). 
 139.  Hadley, 156 Eng. Rep. at 147-48.  
It’s not the same passage that Parke said stated the “sensible rule”.  Id. at 147.  The passage 
quoted by the Blanchard court is actually a more restrictive form of the rule, requiring not 
only that the potential loss be foreseeable, but that the circumstances be such that the 
defendant can be thought to have consciously assumed the risk.  This rule, now referred to 
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might be the opinion that everyone reads in their first-year contracts course, 
but, as we shall see, later events conspired to make Blanchard a little-
known footnote in the law of damages. 
IV. MASTERTON V. BROOKLYN ALLOWS LOST PROFITS IN LIMITED 
CIRCUMSTANCES  
In 1845, everything changed.  In an opinion that is little remembered 
today, the New York high court unequivocally announced that lost profits 
could be awarded in a breach of contract case.  Masterton v. Brooklyn140 
was a suit by a firm that had contracted to supply the marble to be used in 
the new city hall in Brooklyn.  The city had run out of funds and ceased 
construction when it had taken delivery of only a small fraction of the 
marble.141  When the sellers sued, the trial judge, who was the son of 
Chancellor James Kent, the author of Kent’s Commentaries, charged the 
jury that they should award as damages the difference between the contract 
price and what it would have cost the plaintiffs to acquire, process, and 
deliver the marble.142  The defendants objected to the charge and requested 
a charge that no profits could be awarded.  When Judge Kent refused their 
request, the defendants appealed.143  The Supreme Court of Judicature 
reversed the trial judge and granted a new trial, but not because he 
instructed the jury to award lost profits.  His error, they said, was 
instructing the jury to take into account in their damage calculations the 
subcontract the plaintiffs had made in order to acquire the marble.144 
In his opinion, Chief Justice Nelson145 acknowledged that: 
[i]t is not to be denied that there are profits or gains derivable 
from a contract which are uniformly rejected as too contingent 
and speculative in their nature, and too dependent upon 
fluctuation of markets and the chances of business, to enter into a 
safe or reasonable estimate of damages.146 
He also noted that the civil law generally denied recovery of lost 
profits, but for a different reason.  Again quoting from Evan’s translation of 
 
as the tacit agreement test, is still applied in New York (see infra, Part VI. C.) (discussing 
the tacit agreement test) even though most other Anglo-American jurisdictions only require 
the loss be foreseeable.   
 140.  Masterton v. Brooklyn, 7 Hill 61 (N.Y. 1845). 
 141.  Id. at 64-65. 
 142.  Id. at 66. 
 143.  Id. 
 144.  Id. at 72-74. 
 145.  The Supreme Court of Judicature issued three opinions in the case.  That of Chief 
Justice Nelson appears first in the report and is the longest.  
 146.  Id. at 67. 
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Pothier, the chief justice explained that the civil law denied lost profits 
because of what would become known in the common law world as “the 
rule of Hadley v. Baxendale”: 
“In general,” says Pothier, “the parties are deemed to have 
contemplated only the damages and interest which the creditor 
might suffer from the non-performance of the obligation, in 
respect to the particular thing which is the object of it, and not 
such as may have been incidentally occasioned thereby in respect 
to his other affairs.”147 
In other words, lost profits are disallowed not because of a general rule 
prohibiting their recovery, but because they are not contemplated at the 
time of contract formation.148  The chief justice noted that this objection to 
the recovery of lost profits did not apply in the case where the damages 
sought were “the direct and immediate fruits of the contract entered into 
between the parties.”149 
With respect to the argument that the profits were too uncertain to be 
awarded as damages, the chief justice said the concern that it was 
impossible to predict the way that costs would change over the life of the 
contract, the sort of concern that had troubled Justice Story,150 could be 
dealt with by estimating the plaintiff’s cost of fulfilling the contract on the 
market prices prevailing at the time of breach.151  The costs not incurred by 
the plaintiff due to the breach would be subtracted from the unpaid contract 
price.  Rather than trying to estimate how the costs of labor and materials 
would rise or fall over the three and a half years remaining in the contract, 
the jury should estimate the damages on the basis of the prices prevailing at 
the time of the breach.152  The chief justice used the reasoning that would 
later form the basis for the Hadley v. Baxendale opinion to hold that the 
jury should not take into account the subcontracts the plaintiffs had entered 
into to acquire the unfinished marble.  He said that the defendants had no 
control over the making of the subcontracts and therefore were neither 
required to assume the burden of unfavorable subcontracts nor to gains the 
 
 147.  Id. at 68. 
 148.  We use the word “contemplated” rather than foreseeable, because that was the term 
more commonly used prior to the mid-twentieth century.  The meaning of that term has 
changed over the years and for many years it meant that the damages had to be not only 
foreseeable, but actually foreseen and in some jurisdictions the defendant had to accept 
liability, at least tacitly.  See infra text accompanying notes Part VI. C. 
 149.  Masterton, 7 Hill at 69. 
 150.  See supra notes 100-04 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Story’s opinion, 
“The Lively”).  
 151.  Masterton, 7 Hill at 70. 
 152.  Id. at 71. 
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benefits from favorable ones.153  In other words, it was not contemplated at 
the time the prime contract was made that the plaintiff would enter into 
subcontracts that deviated from the norm for that kind of contract. 
The chief justice did not give the jury free rein to award damages as 
they thought fit.  In fact, he gave what could be a good summary of the 
modern rule that lost profits can be recovered only when their amount is 
proven with reasonable certainty: 
[T]he parties will be obliged to go into an enquiry as to the actual 
cost of furnishing the article at the place of delivery; and the 
court and jury should see that in estimating this amount, it be 
made upon a substantial basis, and not left to rest upon the loose 
and speculative opinions of witnesses.  The constituent elements 
of the cost should be ascertained from sound and reliable sources; 
from practical men, having experience in the particular 
department of labor to which the contract relates.  It is a very 
easy matter to figure out large profits upon paper; but it will be 
found that these, in a great majority of the cases, become 
seriously reduced when subjected to the contingencies and 
hazards incident to actual performance . . . . [A jury] should not 
overlook the risks and contingencies which are almost 
inseparable from the execution of contracts like the one in 
question, and which increase the expense independently of the 
outlays in labor and capital.154 
In a separate opinion, Justice Beardsley concurred with the 
proposition that lost profits could be recovered when they were direct 
damages, but made it clear that they could not be recovered in contract 
when they were consequential damages: 
Remote and contingent damages, depending on the result of 
successive schemes or investments, are never allowed for the 
violation of any contract.  But profits to be earned and made by 
the faithful execution of a fair contract are not of this description.  
A right to damages equivalent to such profits results directly and 
immediately from the act of the party who prevents the contract 
from being performed.155 
Other courts soon followed Masterton and allowed plaintiffs to 
recover lost profits in contract cases as long as they were direct damages.156  
 
 153.  Id. at 72. 
 154.  Id. at 72-73. 
 155.  Id. at 74. 
 156.  See, e.g., Chi. & Rock Island R.R. Co. v. Ward, 16 Ill. 522, 530-31 (1855) (finding 
that farmer could recover lost profits where railroad breached covenant to maintain fence); 
Bridges v. Stickney, 38 Me. 361, 368 (1854) (allowing recovery of direct damages but not 
consequential damages); Hoy v. Gronoble, 34 Pa. 9, 10-11 (1859) (enabling sharecropper to 
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In Fox v. Harding,157 itself a widely cited opinion, the Supreme Court of 
Massachusetts said that lost profits could be recovered if they were “the 
direct and immediate results” of the contract, but not if they were the result 
of “independent and collateral undertakings.”158 
As noted above, the first edition of Sedgwick’s treatise on damages 
was published in 1847, shortly after the Masterton opinion appeared.  
Further, in addition to all of the chapters dealing with the narrow rules in 
individual types of actions, Sedgwick did have a chapter titled “Of Remote 
and Consequential Damages.”  In this chapter, he stated the general rule as 
to consequential damages—they are not awarded except in the case of 
deliberate wrongdoing: 
[T]he law refuses to take into consideration any damages 
remotely or consequentially resulting from the act complained of.  
This general principle pervades the civil law as well as the 
common law, and applies equally to cases of breach of contract, 
and of violation of duty; to all cases, in short, where no complaint 
is made of any deliberate intention to injure.  In these latter cases 
we have seen that our law does not pause at the line of mere 
compensation, but proceeds to punish the offender.159 
However, he went on to say that this rule and the reasons given for it 
are not consistent.  He took the position that in actuality the rule against the 
award of consequential damages was simply a generalization from what we 
today refer to as the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale.  In a passage that 
Hadley’s barristers were to quote in their argument before the Court of the 
Exchequer, Sedgwick said: 
It is sometimes said in regard to contracts, that the defendant 
shall be held liable for those damages only which both parties 
may fairly be supposed to have at the time contemplated as likely 
to result from the nature of the agreement, and this appears to be 
the rule adopted by the writers upon the civil law.160 
Sedgwick then went on to give a picturesque example from the 
ubiquitous Pothier.  If a seller breaches a contract to sell a horse, the 
 
recover profits lost when landowner breached oral contract); Hinckley v. Beckwith, 13 Wis. 
31, 35 (1860) (holding that the lost profits of sawmill were recoverable). 
See also Water Lot Co. v. Leonard, 30 Ga. 560, 577 (Ga. 1860) (denying recovery of 
consequential damages but relying on Masterton to support dictum that direct damages 
could be recovered); Simmons v. Brown, 5 R.I. 299, 302-03 (1858) (relying on Masterton to 
allow mill owner to recover lost profits where defendant’s dam reduced water flow at mill). 
 157.  61 Mass. 516, 516 (1851). 
 158.  Id. at 522. 
 159.  SEDGWICK, supra note 74, at 63-64. 
 160.  Id. at 64 (quoted at Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 147 (1854) (argument 
of Keating and Dowdeswell)). 
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damages are the difference between the contract price and the price the 
buyer has to pay to obtain a substitute animal.161 
But on the other hand, if the purchaser were a canon, and by 
reason of the non-delivery of the horse, could not arrive at his 
residence in season to receive his gros fruits, the seller is not 
liable for the loss of those gros fruits, because this was not 
foreseen at the time of the contract.162 
After another example, Sedgwick noted that Pothier had further 
qualified his initial qualification, saying: 
But if on the other hand, the horse above referred to had been 
sold for the express object of enabling the canon to arrive in time 
for his gros fruits, . . . then the injuries which otherwise would be 
remote and consequential, become direct and immediate, and 
constitute a valid claim, as forming part of the contract between 
the parties.163 
This statement goes beyond the rule of Masterton because it deals 
with damages that are not the failure to receive the other party’s 
performance as in Masterton, but are what we today would likely call a 
consequential loss.  This can be confusing to the modern reader because it 
makes a distinction between direct damages and consequential damages 
that is different from the one we make.  We generally think of direct 
damages as those that compensate the injured party for the loss of the 
promised performance, whereas consequential damages compensate for 
additional losses, such as the loss of profits on contracts with third 
parties.164  We say that these consequential losses are recoverable in 
contract only if they were foreseeable to the breaching party at the time 
they entered into the contract.165  Under the Pothier/Sedgwick terminology, 
consequential damages are those damages that were not foreseeable and 
thus were never recoverable, absent deliberate wrongdoing.  Losses that 
were within the contemplation of the parties at the time they entered into 
the contract were called direct damages, even if they were the result of 
some collateral undertaking, such as a contract to resell the purchased 
 
 161.  Id.  This is of course the modern rule.  See U.C.C. § 2-713 (laying out the modern 
rule).  Actually, the example seems to assume that the contract was made at the market price 
because it speaks in terms of a rise in prices necessitating the payment of a higher price. 
 162.  Id. 
 163.  Id. at 65. 
 164.  See, e.g., Schonfeld v. Hilliard, 218 F.3d 164, 175-76 (2d Cir. 2000) (explaining 
the distinction between direct or “general” damages and consequential or “special” 
damages). 
 165.  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 33, at § 351 (1979) 
(commenting that a contracting party is accountable for those risks that are foreseeable at 
the time of contract formation). 
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goods. 
V. GRIFFIN V. COLVER COMPLETES THE TRANSFORMATION 
In 1854, the Court of the Exchequer issued its famous opinion in 
Hadley v. Baxendale.  The opinion quickly became known in the United 
States, but it didn’t have much immediate effect on the recovery of lost 
profits.  There were two reasons for this.  First, the rule was already known 
in the United States, so much so that Kent had years before set out a 
version of it in his Commentaries.166  More importantly, American courts 
had not yet begun awarding lost profits as damages, except where they 
were direct benefit of the bargain damages. 
Four years later, however, American courts did begin awarding lost 
profits as consequential damages.  In 1858, the newly-established New 
York Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Griffin v. Colver.167  
Substantively, the facts of Griffin were identical to those of Blanchard v. 
Ely, and arguably Griffin should not even have been appealed.  The case 
involved the building, not of a steamboat, but of a steam engine for a 
lumber mill.  Once again, the builder sued for the contract price, and once 
again the defendant attempted to offset the profits lost because the product 
was not delivered on time.168  The referee before whom the case was tried 
held that the lost profits were not a proper measure of damages.  Instead, he 
awarded the defendants $66.12 as compensation for the loss of use of their 
property.169  This was in keeping with a rule of the time that the proper 
measure of damages in such cases was the use value of the property or 
capital involved.170  After the supreme court affirmed the judgment entered 
 
 166.   See KENT, supra note 95, at 480 (“Damages for breach of contract are only those 
which are incidental to, and directly caused by the breach, and may reasonably be supposed 
to have entered into the contemplation of the parties, and not speculative profits, or 
accidental or consequential losses or the loss of a fancied good bargain.”). 
Later commentators may have failed to understand the significance of Kent’s statement 
because they did not realize that when Kent wrote, the term “consequential damages” was 
understood to exclude any damages that were contemplated by the parties at the time they 
entered into the contract. 
 167.  16 N.Y. 489 (N.Y. 1858). 
 168.  See Griffin v. Colver, 22 Barb. 587, 587 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1855) (providing a hearing 
of complaint that sought to recover lost profits for the time of performance over what was 
stipulated in the contract). 
 169.  See id. at 588 (summarizing referee’s finding that the delay in performance of the 
contract caused defendant’s to sustain $66.12 in damages).  
 170.  See infra Part VI.B (noting that most courts followed the rule that where a party is 
deprived of the use of property, the measure of damages is not lost profits, but rather the 
rental value of the property involved). 
ARTICLE 2 (LLOYD-CHASE) (DO NOT DELETE) 2/16/16  2:09 PM 
2016] RECOVERY OF DAMAGES FOR LOST PROFITS 347 
 
on the referee’s report,171 the plaintiff appealed to the new Court of 
Appeals. 
The Court of Appeals’ opinion gets directly to the point.  It begins by 
acknowledging that there is a “rule which precludes the allowance of 
profits, by way of damages, for the breach of an executory contract.”172  
But it then immediately states that the rule is not to be taken literally: 
To determine whether this rule was correctly applied by the 
referee, it is necessary to recur to the reason upon which it is 
founded.  It is not a primary rule, but is a mere deduction from 
that more general and fundamental rule which requires that the 
damages claimed should in all cases be shown, by clear and 
satisfactory evidence, to have been actually sustained.  It is a well 
established rule of the common law that the damages to be 
recovered for a breach of contract must be shown with certainty, 
and not left to speculation or conjecture; and it is under this rule 
that profits are excluded from the estimate of damages in such 
cases, and not because there is anything in their nature which 
should per se prevent their allowance.  Profits which would 
certainly have been realized but for the defendant’s default are 
recoverable; those which are speculative or contingent are not.173 
This one paragraph has become the basis for the modern law of lost profits: 
lost profits may be recovered in contract, but only if they are proven with 
certainty.  (We now say “reasonable certainty.”  This will be discussed 
later.174) 
This was a huge change from the prior law.  Even after Masterton, 
courts had uniformly refused to award lost profits as consequential 
damages in contract cases.  While some courts had used the difficulty of 
proof as a justification for the rule that lost profits could not be recovered 
as consequential damages, they nevertheless adhered to it as a per se rule, 
rather than considering the possibility that in some cases the lost profits 
could easily be determined.175 
To support the novel proposition it was advancing as settled law, the 
 
 171.  See Griffin, 22 Barb. at 593 (affirming the judgment and report of the referee, 
thereby disallowing a recovery of lost profits).   
 172.  Griffin, 16 N.Y. at 491. 
 173.  Id.  
 174.  See infra notes 266-75 and accompanying text (tracing the development of the 
reasonable certainty rule as distinguished from the absolute certainty rule). 
 175.  See, e.g., Taylor v. Maguire, 12 Mo. 313, 319-20 (Mo. 1848) (refusing to award 
defendant lost profit damages). Interestingly, another justification the court gave for denying 
the recovery of lost profits was that “[t]he loss . . . which forms the criterion of damages . . . 
must be a loss within the probable contemplation of the parties at the time of the execution 
of the contract.”  Id. at 318.  This is just one more instance of American courts anticipating 
the Hadley rule.   
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court used a technique that would later be perfected by Judges such 
Benjamin Cardozo on this same New York Court of Appeals and Roger 
Traynor on the California Supreme Court.  It analyzed the leading cases 
that seemed to support the contrary point of view and argued that if you 
looked at the facts and what the court actually decided on the basis of those 
facts, rather than looking at the language these courts used in support of 
their reasoning, the cases really did support the judge’s rule, not the 
opposing rule for which they were cited.176  More importantly, it embraced 
the emerging trend toward replacing narrow, situation-specific rules with 
broad principles of general application.177 
To work this transformation, the court began by discussing a group of 
rules that depended on the market price of goods and attempted to show 
that these are in reality specific applications of the general rule that lost 
profits can be recovered when they can be proven with certainty and cannot 
be recovered when they cannot.178  It cited the rule that in an action for 
breach of a contract to transport goods, the damages are the difference 
between the price of the goods at the point of origin and the price at the 
destination and the rule that where a seller breaches a contract to sell 
goods, the damages are the difference between the contract price and the 
market price at the time and place for delivery.  “[T]his,” the court said, 
“amounts to an allowance of profits.”179  It is recoverable because “those 
profits do not depend upon any contingency.”180  The court then goes on to 
distinguish the cases that do not allow the recovery of profits in the case of 
the illegal capture of goods at sea or in the case of insurance for goods lost 
at sea.  In those cases, “the fluctuation of the markets and the contingencies 
affecting the length of the voyage render every calculation of profits 
speculative and unsafe,”181 whereas in cases involving the transportation of 
goods by land, the market price at the destination “can be ascertained with 
reasonable certainty.”182 
 
 176.  See Arthur L. Corbin, Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of Contracts, 39 COLUM. 
L. REV. 56 (1939) (discussing Cardozo’s method); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas 
Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641 (Cal. 1968) (exemplifying Traynor’s method). 
Cf. Grant Gilmore, Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure, 70 YALE L.J. 1037, 1045 (1961) 
(describing Cardozo’s method in an alternative way). 
 177.  See GILMORE, supra note 4, at 41-67 (1977) (describing how courts in the period 
from the post-Civil War to World War I viewed themselves as discovering immutable rules 
of law rather than adapting the law to changing conditions).  
 178.  See Griffin v. Colver, 16 N.Y. 489, 491-92 (N.Y. 1858) (using existence of 
predictable market price to reach conclusion that damages for lost profits may not be 
speculative). 
 179.  Griffin, 16 N.Y. at 491.   
 180.  Id. 
 181.  Id. at 492. 
 182.  Id. 
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One can certainly question this reasoning.  The rules cited are not 
rules allowing the injured party to recover its lost profits.  They are rules 
that give a fixed measure of damages that will in many cases approximate 
the party’s actual lost profits.  But if they were really intended to give the 
injured party its lost profits, they would, like their modern equivalents, 
allow the injured party to prove that its damages were greater than the 
amount allowed by the rule (or to allow the defendant to prove that the 
damages were less).  For instance, there might be cases where the buyer or 
the shipper had a contract to sell the goods to a third party at a price above 
(or below) the prevailing market price (perhaps because the contract had 
been made at a time when the price was higher or lower) or there might be 
cases where the buyer or the shipper needed the goods for a special purpose 
(think of Hadley’s mill shaft).  The pre-Griffin rules made no provision for 
that.183 
As further support for the idea that it was the difficulty of determining 
the profits to be made from a sea voyage that was the reason for the per se 
rule against allowing such profits, the court quoted part of the passage from 
Justice Story’s opinion in The Lively quoted earlier in this article.184 
Next, the court jumped to a truly amazing conclusion:  “Indeed, it is 
clear that whenever profits are rejected as an item of damages, it is because 
they are subject to too many contingencies, and are too dependent upon the 
fluctuations of markets and the chances of business, to constitute a safe 
criterion for an estimate of damages.”185  We have added the emphasis to 
make clear how incredibly broad a statement the court was making.  It is 
particularly significant, because cases in New York and other American 
jurisdictions had almost never allowed the recovery of lost profits as 
consequential damages and had given many reasons for not doing so, most 
 
 183.  See supra notes 103-32 and accompanying text (showing lack of flexibility to 
prove higher or lower damages). 
 184.  Griffin, 16 N.Y. at 492. The opinion said: 
 
[T]hat these are the true reasons is shown by the language of Mr. Justice Story, 
in the case of the Schooner Lively (1 Gallis., 315), which was a case of illegal 
capture.  He says:  “Independent, however, of all authority, I am satisfied upon 
principle, that an allowance of damages, upon the basis of a calculation of 
profits, is inadmissible.  The rule would be in the highest degree unfavorable to 
the interests of the community.  The subject would be involved in utter 
uncertainty.  The calculation would proceed upon contingencies, and would 
require a knowledge of foreign markets to an exactness in point of time and 
value which would sometimes present embarrassing obstacles.  Much would 
depend upon the length of the voyage, and the season of arrival; much upon the 
vigilance and activity of the master, and much upon the momentary demand.  
After all, it would be a calculation upon conjecture, and not upon facts. 
 185.  Id. (emphasis supplied). 
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commonly that there was a rule that mandated a specific damages formula 
that did not include lost profits.186  But the court goes on to say:  “The 
decision in the case of Blanchard v. Ely (21 Wend., 342) must have 
proceeded upon this ground, and can, as I apprehend, be supported upon no 
other.”187  The court explains that the “Rule of Pothier” (i.e., the rule now 
known as the Rule of Hadley v. Baxendale) as it was discussed in 
Blanchard v. Ely and says that it cannot have applied in that case: 
In Blanchard v. Ely the damages claimed consisted in the loss of 
the use of the very article which the plaintiff had agreed to 
construct; and were, therefore, in the plainest sense, the direct 
and proximate result of the breach alleged.  Moreover, that use 
was contemplated by the parties in entering into the contract, and 
constituted the object for which the steamboat was built.  It is 
clear, therefore, that the rule of Pothier had nothing to do with the 
case.  Those damages must then have been disallowed, because 
they consisted of profits depending, not, as in the case of a 
contract to transport goods, upon a mere question of market 
value, but upon the fluctuations of travel and of trade, and many 
other contingencies.188 
This reasoning is interesting for a couple of reasons.  First, contrary to 
the court’s assertion, it is not at all clear that the civil law consequential 
damages rule (the “rule of Pothier”) had nothing to do with the case.  It 
might well have precluded recovery in Blanchard v. Ely.  It is true that the 
rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, as it is now applied in most American 
jurisdictions, would hold that the builder’s knowledge that the boat was to 
be used to carry passengers for hire would be enough to make the builder 
liable for the normal profits lost on account of delays in making it 
serviceable.189  But the civil law rule, at least as understood by the 
Blanchard v. Ely court, required more than mere foreseeability.  In a 
portion of the opinion previously quoted, the Blanchard court had said: 
[Pothier] also adverts to the distinction that the vendor may, 
notwithstanding, incur liability for extrinsic damages of the 
creditor, if it appear they were stipulated for or tacitly submitted 
to in the contract.  One instance of this is that of stipulating to 
deliver a horse in such time that a certain advantage may be 
gained reaching such a place.  There the debtor shall, on default, 
 
 186.  See supra notes 106-35 and accompanying text (showing reluctance to award lost 
profits as consequential damages). 
 187.  Griffin, 16 N.Y. at 492. 
 188.  Id. at 493-94.   
 189.  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 33, at § 351, ill. 5 
(1989) (illustrating reasonable foreseeability of lost profits when the breaching party has 
knowledge that delay will lead to inability to run operation at full capacity).  
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pay for the loss of the advantage.190 
This seems to say that in order to recover consequential damages, the 
plaintiff must do more than simply show the defendant had reason to know 
the damages would be incurred; it must show the defendant had agreed, at 
least tacitly, that it would be liable for those damages.  This rule, 
sometimes called the “tacit agreement test,” was adopted by most 
American jurisdictions in the years following Hadley v. Baxendale.191  
Most American jurisdictions dropped it in favor of a more liberal reading 
of Hadley early in the twentieth century, but, interestingly, the courts of 
New York still retain it.192 
With Griffin’s rejection of the foreseeability requirement as the rule of 
decision in Blanchard v. Ely, that opinion became just another forgotten 
nineteenth century opinion.  It was not cited in scholarly writing until 2005 
when scholars writing about Hadley v. Baxendale in honor of the 150th 
anniversary of the issuance of that opinion noted that an American court 
had adopted the same rule a decade and a half before the Court of the 
Exchequer.193 
VI. LATER DEVELOPMENT 
A. The Griffin Rule Spreads 
If Blanchard was quickly forgotten, Griffin quickly gained notoriety.  
It soon became known as the “leading American case” on the recovery of 
lost profits.194  Courts in other jurisdictions began almost immediately to 
cite it for the proposition that lost profits were now a recoverable item of 
damages. 
The first of these was the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Hinkley v. 
 
 190.  Blanchard v. Ely, 21 Wend. 342, 348 (N.Y. 1839) (emphasis supplied). 
 191.  See infra, Part VI. C (tracing the development of the tacit agreement test in English 
and American law).  
 192.  See, e.g., Kenford Co. v. County of Erie, 537 N.E.2d 176, 178-89 (N.Y. 1989) 
(finding that a County that failed to build a stadium was not liable to pay damages for the 
loss of anticipated appreciation value of the land where the stadium would have been 
located because the County never contemplated that it would be liable for such a loss). 
 193.  See Wayne Barnes, Hadley v. Baxendale and Other Common Law Borrowings 
from the Civil Law, 11 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 627, 635-36 (2005); Perillo, supra note 47, 
at 273-74 (describing the influence of Pothier’s contemplation of the parties test on the 
Blanchard court). 
 194.  See, e.g., Jones v. Nathop, 1 P. 435, 437 (Colo. 1883) (describing Griffin as “the 
leading American case”); accord Western Gravel Road Co. v. Cox, 39 Ind. 260, 261 (Ind. 
1872) (citing Griffin as the leading American case on lost profits); see also Manville v. 
Western Union Tel. Co., 37 Iowa 214, 219 (1873) (calling Griffin “a leading American 
authority on the subject”). 
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Beckwith,195 decided just two years after Griffin.  A sawmill lease provided 
that the lessors would make any repairs that cost more than five dollars and 
were necessary to keep the sawmill running.196  When the engine failed in 
the last sixty days of the lease term, the lessors refused to repair it.197  In the 
resulting lawsuit, the trial court awarded the lessees the profits they had lost 
in during the time the mill was out of service198 and the defendant appealed.  
Interestingly, both parties cited Griffin in their briefs to the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court.  The lessees cited it for the proposition that lost profits 
were recoverable and the lessors cited it for the proposition that they were 
not.199  The Supreme Court sided with the lessees, discussing Griffin at 
length and saying that it “fully sustains” the rule allowing lost profits to be 
recovered.200 
After Hinckley, the Griffin rule spread by stealth.  Courts in many 
jurisdictions issued opinions upholding denials of lost profits (or reversing 
awards of lost profits), but in doing so they cited Griffin.  These courts 
reasoned that under proper circumstances lost profits were recoverable, and 
that the instant cases were not the proper circumstances.201  The most 
important of these opinions was that of the United States Supreme Court in 
United States v. Behan.202  Behan had been working under a contract with 
the Army to make improvements in the harbor of New Orleans when the 
Army decided that it was not worthwhile to continue the work and 
terminated the contract.203  Behan thereupon petitioned the War Department 
for his expenses to date and the profit he would have made had he been 
allowed to complete the contract.204  When he was not paid, he sued in the 
Court of Claims, which only awarded him his expenditures to date, finding 
that he had not sufficiently proven his lost profits.205  The Supreme Court 
 
 195.  13 Wis. 31 (1860). 
 196.  Id. at 33.   
 197.  Id. 
 198.  Id. at 32.   
 199.  Id. at 31, 34 
 200.  Id. at 34-35. 
 201.  See, e.g., Jones v. Nathop, 1 P. 435, 437 (Colo. 1883) (describing Griffin as “the 
leading American case,” but rejecting lost profits claim because profits were “speculative”); 
Western Gravel Road Co. v. Cox, 39 Ind. 260, 261-263 (Ind. 1872) (quoting Griffin at 
length but holding that lost profits not proven with sufficient certainty); U.S. Tel. Co. v. 
Gildersleve, 29 Md. 232, 250-51 (1868) (discussing Griffin but reversing lost profit award 
because loss not foreseeable); Cushing v. Seymour, 15 N.W. 249, 250 (Minn. 1883) (citing 
Griffin for the proposition that lost profits can be recovered if reasonably certain, but 
holding plaintiff’s lost profits were not proven with reasonable certainty). 
 202.  110 U.S. 338 (1884). 
 203.  Id. at 339-40. 
 204.  Id. at 340-41. 
 205.  Id. at 342-43. 
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affirmed the Court of Claims, but in doing so stated unequivocally that lost 
profits may be recovered in proper circumstances and that this principle 
was so well established that “[i]t is unnecessary to review the authorities on 
this subject.”206  Behan added weight to the growing Griffin consensus and 
by the end of the 1880s courts throughout the nation had acknowledged the 
principle that lost profits were a proper item of damages.207 
Some of the cases giving rise to these acknowledgments were the 
routine eighteenth century commercial cases (mills and shipping contracts 
continued to play leading roles)208 and some involved interesting situations.  
In 1889, the New Mexico Supreme Court relied on Griffin to allow a doctor 
to recover the fee he would have earned by travelling to a town one-
hundred miles away to treat a gunshot victim.209  A telegram asking him to 
 
 206.  Id. at 346. 
 207.  See, e.g., Bell v. Reynold & Lee, 78 Ala. 511, 514 (1885) (finding that lost profits 
from an anticipated resale are recoverable); Jones. v. Nathop, 1 P. 435, 437 (Colo. 1883) 
(stipulating that the lost profits claim is a valid principle); Cohn v. Norton, 18 A. 595, 597 
(Conn. 1889) (holding that definite and certain profits lost through the breach of a contract 
are recoverable); Chicago R.R. Co. v. Hale, 83 Ill. 360, 363-64 (1876) (allowing recovery 
for lost profits where an outstanding contract is present or the future purpose of goods is 
known); City of Terre Haute v. Hudnut, 13 N.E. 686 (Ind. 1887) (directing award of 
damages for lost profits resulting from a hiatus of business activity caused by a breach of 
contract); Alexander v. Bishop, 13 N.W. 714, 717 (Iowa 1882) (recognizing that recovery 
would be allowed definite and certain lost profits resulting from a breach); Stewart v. 
Power, 12 Kan. 596, 599-600 (1874) (ordering recovery of damages for lost profits where 
this loss was contemplated during the formation of the breached contract); Cushing v. 
Seymour, 15 N.W. 249, 250 (Minn. 1883) (holding that reasonably certain lost profits 
resulting from a breach of contract may be recovered); Deming v. Grand Trunk R.R. Co. 48 
N.H. 455, 471 (1869) (noting that recovery for lost profits would be allowed for breach of 
contracts made in reference to a resale); Wisner v. Barber, 10 Or. 342, 344 (1882) 
(affirming that “the allowance of profits [is] now well established”); McHose v. Fulmer, 73 
Pa. 365, 367 (1873) (holding that actual loss of profits is the appropriate measure of 
damages in a contract breach where the goods cannot be readily replaced); Simmons v. 
Brown, 5 R.I. 299, 305-06 (1858) (finding that a loss of profits that is the direct and 
necessary result is recoverable); Hinckley v. Beckwith, 13 Wis. 31 (Wis. 1860) (establishing 
lost profits or earnings as a proper item for consideration in the calculation of damages). 
See also Ye Seng Co. v. Corbitt & Macleay, 9 F. 423 (D. Or. 1881) (relying on Griffin to 
allow recovery of lost profits in admiralty for breach of charter-party); Shouse v. 
Neiswaanger, 18 Mo. App. 236, 250-51 (1885) (allowing recovery of lost profits on remand 
if foreseeable).  
By 1890, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court seems to have thought the recovery of lost profits 
in contract to be so uncontroversial that it found it unnecessary to cite a single authority in 
an opinion upholding a verdict for lost profits.  Imperial Coal Co. v. Port Royal Coal Co., 20 
A. 937, 937 (Pa. 1890).  
 208.  See, e.g., Pac. Sheet Metal Works v. Californian Canneries, Co., 164 F. 980, 985 
(9th Cir. 1908) (awarding lost profits where storms delayed shipment); Morrow v. Mo. Pac. 
Ry. Co., 123 S.W. 1034, 1039 (Mo. Ct. App. 1909) (involving delay in shipment of mill 
rolls). 
 209.  Western Union Tel. Co. v. Longwill, 21 P. 339 (N.M. 1889). 
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come was not delivered in a timely manner, and as a result, the victim died 
before the doctor could treat him and earn his fee.210  The court said that 
under Griffin, the injured party is entitled to recover all damages, including 
gains prevented as well as losses sustained.211 
B. A New Rule Limiting Lost Profits 
There were, however, still some bumps on the road to the present law 
of lost profits.  One of these bumps was created by the Griffin opinion 
itself.  Like Ophelia (“the lady doth protest too much, methinks”212), Judge 
Selden knew he was on shaky ground when he tried to explain away 
Blanchard v. Ely, and he went on explaining for too long.  In doing so, he 
inadvertently created a new rule that slowed the development of the law of 
lost profits: 
Had the defendants in the case of Blanchard v. Ely . . . taken the 
ground that they were entitled to recoup, not the uncertain and 
contingent profits of the trips lost, but such sum as they could 
have realized by chartering the boat for those trips, I think their 
claim must have been sustained . . . . 
 
The rent of a mill or other similar property, the price which 
should be paid for the charter of a steamboat, or the use of 
machinery, &c., &c., are not only susceptible of more exact and 
definite proof, but in a majority of cases would, I think, be found 
to be a more accurate measure of the damages actually sustained 
in the class of cases referred to . . . .213 
What the court is saying here is that if the lost profits are uncertain, 
the plaintiff can be awarded the lost profits of some other hypothetical 
enterprise that it could have entered into but for the defendant’s default.  
This led courts to adopt a number of narrow rules for application in similar 
situations.  Most courts adopted some version of the rule that where a party 
is deprived of the use of property by the defendant’s action or omission, the 
measure of damages is not the profits lost, but rather the rental value of the 
property of which they were deprived.  The reasoning by which they 
reached this conclusion varied.  The Supreme Court of Iowa put it in terms 
of a Hadley v. Baxendale issue: 
[O]n the principle that speculative profits are not deemed to have 
been within the contemplation of the parties, where there is some 
 
 210.  Id. at 340. 
 211.  Id. at 342. 
 212.  WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 3, sc. 2. 
 213.  Griffin, 16 N.Y. 489, 496-497 (N.Y. 1858). 
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other more substantial basis on which to reckon the damages for 
breach of contract, it has been generally held that where the 
contract was as to the completion of a building or boat, or for the 
use of land or machinery, or the like, the rental value of the use 
of which the party was deprived should be taken as the measure 
of his damage, and that he could not substitute therefor or include 
therein profits which he should have made in such use.214 
The court went on to say:  “It is well established by the decided 
preponderance of authority that where future profits are in the 
contemplation of the parties, and there is no other basis on which damages 
for breach of contract can be estimated, such profits may be made the basis 
for the recovery of damages.”215 
The Michigan Supreme Court, in a tort case where the defendant 
wrongfully took possession of the plaintiff’s boat, phrased the rule as a per 
se rule disallowing profits and instead allowing the recovery of the rental 
value of the boat: 
The measure of damages is not to be made to depend upon the 
use, or non-use, of the property by the defendant; neither can the 
use to which the plaintiff could have put the property during its 
detention, and the prospective estimates of profits therefrom, 
contingent upon his chance of business, determine the value of its 
use.  Such rule would be too uncertain and speculative.216 
The Illinois Supreme Court applied similar reasoning to reverse an 
award of lost profits and give a farmer the rental value of his land when the 
City of Chicago flooded the land and prevented him from growing a year’s 
crop.217  In doing so, it overruled a previous case allowing the farmer to 
recover his lost profits under similar circumstances.218 
Most courts, however, did not bother elaborating their reasoning, let 
alone qualifying the rule.  They simply stated that the established rule was 
that the injured party was entitled to the rental value, not the lost profits.219  
 
 214.  Hirschhorn v. Bradley, 90 N.W. 592, 594-95 (Iowa 1902). 
 215.  Id. at 595. (emphasis added). See also Connersville Wagon Co. v. McFarlan 
Carriage Co., 76 N.E. 294, 299 (Ind. 1905) (deciding that “the value of the use should be 
regarded as the basis for a recovery, where a case is made for an allowance of special 
damages growing out of a deprivation of the use of property”). 
 216.  Aber v. Bratton, 27 N.W. 564, 566 (Mich. 1886). 
 217.  See City of Chicago v. Huenerbein, 85 Ill. 594, 595-96 (Ill. 1877) (overruling 
Chicago & Rock Island R.R. Co v. Ward, 16 Ill. 522, 530-31 (1855). 
 218.  Id. at 596. 
 219.  See, e.g., Sinker et al. v. Kidder, 24 N.E. 341, 341 (Ind. 1890) (relying on Griffin); 
Benton v. Fay, 64 Ill. 417, 420-21 (1872) (finding damages were rental value of entire plant 
where operation of plant delayed because of late delivery of planning machine); Strobel 
Steel Constr. Co. v. Sanitary Dist. of Chicago, 160 Ill. App. 554, 564 (Ill. App. Ct. 1911) 
(relying on Griffin to award rental value of plaintiff’s plant where construction was delayed 
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Ironically, Griffin was often cited as the leading case for this rule.220 
Similarly, where sales agents for a sewing machine company sought 
the profits they lost because the company failed to supply the agents with 
machines as promised, the Iowa Supreme court, after an extensive 
discussion of Griffin, which it characterized as a leading case, held that the 
agents were entitled to the value of their time and that the trial court had 
erred in instructing the jury that they could “take into consideration the 
market demand for such machines in the country.”221 
Some courts gave Griffin a slightly different interpretation.  The 
Griffin opinion said: 
Cases not unfrequently occur in which . . . it is certain that some 
loss has been sustained or damage incurred, and that such loss or 
damage is the direct, immediate, and natural consequence of the 
breach of the contract, but where the amount of the damages may 
be estimated in a variety of ways.  In all such cases the law . . . 
uniformly adopts that mode of estimating damages which is most 
definite and certain.222 
This could be read to mean that if there is one method (such as the 
awarding of lost profits) that is most likely to put the plaintiff in the 
position they would have been in but for the breach of the contract or duty 
and a second method where the calculation is subject to less inaccuracy or 
uncertainty, the court should always adopt the latter.  This may have been 
the reason some cases quoted and relied on this language from Griffin.223   
 But most of these cases seem to have thrown in a citation from Griffin 
as additional authority where the lost profits were too uncertain to be 
recovered.224  One example is a case that eerily parallels the facts of Hadley 
 
because of fault of defendant). See also Brownell et al. v. Chapman, 51 N.W. 249, 250 
(Iowa 1892) (noting that while some cases had adopted the interest that could have been 
earned on the capital invested in the property as the measure of damages, the rental value 
rule far outweighed it in “the number of cases and the reasoning supporting the rule.”  The 
opinion also quoted Griffin).  
 220.  See, e.g., Vilter Mfg. Co. v. Abeel, 191 F. 272, 281 (5th Cir. 1911) (calling Griffin 
“a leading case on the subject”); Washington & Georgetown R.R. Co. v. American Car Co., 
5 App. D.C. 524, 544-46 (1895)(calling Griffin “a leading case on the subject”); Sanitary 
Dist. of Chicago v. McMahon & Montgomery Co., 110 Ill. App. 510, 526 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1903) (calling Griffin “the leading American case” on the subject). 
 221.  Howe Mach. Co. v. Bryson, 44 Iowa 159, 162 (Iowa 1876). 
 222.  Griffin v. Colver, 16 N.Y. 489, 495 (N.Y. 1858). 
 223.  E.g., St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Lilly, 55 So. 937 (Ala. Ct. App. 1911) (finding that 
a salesman could not recover lost profits caused by a carrier’s delay because the profits were 
too uncertain). 
 224.  E.g., Sanitary Dist. of Chicago v. McMahon & Montgomery Co., 110 Ill. App. 510, 
526 (Ill. App. Ct. 1903) (finding that the true measure of damages did not include market 
rental value of dredging equipment during the time appellees were deprived of its use).  
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v. Baxendale.  In S. Ry. Co. v. Coleman,225 a cotton gin was shut down 
because of a broken press pin.  The owner of the gin delivered the pin to 
the Southern Railway, which was to carry it to an iron works at Selma, 
Alabama, 56 miles away, where it was immediately to be repaired and 
returned to the ginner.226  Unlike the famous ambiguity in the Hadley 
opinion,227 there was no question that the ginner had told the railroad agent 
“that his ginnery would be ‘at a standstill’ until the pin should be repaired 
and returned.”228  Nevertheless, through the negligence of the railroad 
employees the pin was not delivered to the iron works for seven days and 
then only because the plaintiff himself went to Selma and located the pin in 
a railroad car.  The pin was then repaired within three hours and returned to 
the gin the next day.  The plaintiff sued to recover the profits lost during 
the time the gin was shut down on account of the railroad’s negligence.229  
The plaintiff said that his profit was 75 cents for each bale of cotton ginned, 
but he could not give a good estimate of the number of bales lost.230  In 
spite of this, the trial judge charged the jury that he was entitled to recover 
his lost profits.  The Alabama Supreme Court, however, reversed the award 
of lost profits.  Its opinion quoted Griffin’s statement that the law adopts 
“the mode of estimating damages which is most definite and certain.”231  It 
concluded that if the period of the delay was long enough for the gin to 
have had an ascertainable rental value for that period, then that rental value 
would be the appropriate measure of damages.  If there was no 
ascertainable rental value for such a short period, then the damages would 
be the interest on the value of the gin.232 
C. The Tacit Agreement Test 
Another roadblock on the highway to a rule allowing the recovery of 
lost profits was the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale.  Although the modern 
reading of Hadley is that lost profits need only to have been foreseeable at 
 
 225.  44. So. 837 (Ala. 1907). 
 226.  Id. at 838. 
 227.  The facts of the case as related by the reporter say that the plaintiffs’ servant told 
the defendant’s clerk that the shaft must be sent immediately because the mill was stopped.  
156 Eng. Rep. at 147.  Baron Alderson’s opinion, however, says that the clerk had no way 
of knowing whether the mill was stopped. Id. at 151. 
Numerous commentators have theorized about this discrepancy.  The best analysis is at 
Danzig, supra note 74, at 262-63.  
 228.  S. Ry. Co., 44. So. at 838. 
 229.  Id. 
 230.  Id. 
 231.  Id.  
 232.  Id. at 839.   
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the time the contract was made,233 courts in many American jurisdictions 
adopted the so-called tacit agreement test.  Under this test, a party seeking 
to recover lost profits (or any other consequential damages) had to do more 
than simply show that the defendant had notice of the special circumstances 
giving rise to the damages.  They had to show that the defendant had 
manifested (expressly or impliedly) an intent to assume the risk of those 
damages.234  This rule apparently originated in England shortly after 
Hadley.  Most accounts trace it back to B.C. Saw-Mill Co. v. Nettleship,235 
an English opinion of 1868.236  The defendant had contracted to transport 
machinery for a sawmill from Glasgow to Vancouver.  One of the boxes, 
which contained many small and important items, failed to arrive at 
Vancouver.237  It took nearly a year for replacement parts to arrive from 
Britain, during which time the sawmill was idle.238  The jury awarded 
damages of 3,000 pounds, the bulk of which (2646l. 2s. 3d.) was the rental 
value of the whole of the machinery (not even the rental value of the 
sawmill, let alone the lost profits from the sawmill).239  The court of 
common pleas, however, reduced the damages to 353l. 17s. 9d., the cost of 
replacing the missing parts, including freight to British Columbia.240  In his 
opinion, Bovill, C.J. said: 
The extent of the carrier’s liability is to be governed by the 
contract he has entered into, and the obligations which the law 
imposes upon him.  He is not to be made liable for damages 
beyond what may fairly be presumed to have been contemplated 
by the parties at the time of entering into the contract.  It must be 
something which could have been foreseen and reasonably 
expected, and to which he has assented expressly or impliedly by 
entering into the contract.241 
 
 233.  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 33, at § 351 
(“Damages are not recoverable for loss that the party in breach did not have reason to 
foresee as a probable result of the breach when the contract was made”). 
 234.  CALIMARI & PERILLO, supra note 2, § 14.5(a). 
 235.  3 C.P. 499, 500 (1868). 
 236.  See, e.g., John R. Hudson, Case Note, Stifft’s Jewelers v. Oliver: The Tacit 
Agreement Test—Arkansas Clings to a Dinosaur, 40 ARK. L. REV. 403, 405 (1986). 
 237.  3 C.P. at 500. 
 238.  Id. 
 239.  Id. at 501. 
 240.  Id. at 505. 
 241.  Id. at 505-06 (emphasis added).  In his concurring opinion, Judge Willes, said that 
the question of consequential damages was a difficult one and described a case from 250 
years earlier in which a man who was travelling to be married to an heiress had a horseshoe 
replaced on the journey.  The blacksmith who replaced the horseshoe did such a bad job of 
the repair that the horse became lame, the groom did not arrive on time and the woman 
married someone else.  Id. at 508.  If the judges considered the case even remotely similar to 
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The leading American authority for the tacit agreement test was Justice 
Holmes’ 1903 opinion in Globe Refining Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co.242 
Another impediment to recovering lost profits was that courts of the 
day seemed unwilling to assume that a party making a contract to supply 
goods or services would foresee that its buyer intended to earn a profit 
through the use or resale of those goods or services.243  For example, in 
1891, defendants who were being sued on a note for the purchase price of 
saw mill machinery attempted to set off the profits they lost because the 
machinery had been delivered two months late.244  Their lawyers, 
undoubtedly having read Hadley v. Baxendale very carefully, included in 
their plea an allegation that the plaintiff’s knew the mill was stopped on 
account of the non-delivery of the machinery.245  The Alabama Supreme 
Court nevertheless held that the plea was “bad” because there was no 
allegation that the plaintiffs knew the defendants had contracts to sell the 
lumber from the mill at a profit.246 
In a 1901 case, Acme Cycle Co. v. Clark,247 the Indiana Supreme Court 
held that a trial court had been correct in refusing to award a bicycle 
manufacturer the profits due to the late delivery of machinery necessary to 
manufacture the hubs for its bicycles.  The court said that even if the 
bicycle company notified the machinery supplier it could manufacture an 
additional 500 bicycles per month, had the hub machines, and sold those 
bicycles at a profit, the company still would not meet the requirements of 
Hadley v. Baxendale (and Griffin v. Colver, which the court cited along 
with Hadley for the foreseeability requirement).248  According to the court: 
The later English cases indicate that, where extraordinary 
 
the one preceding it, one can understand why they decided as they did.  Interestingly, the 
first Restatement of Contracts, which rejected the tacit agreement test, used this fact 
situation as an example of a situation where the breaching party would clearly not be liable.  
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS, infra note 257, at § 330, il. 8 (1932). 
 242.  190 U.S. 540 (1903).  
 243.  See, e.g., Harvey v. Conn. & Passumpsic R.R. Co, 124 Mass. 421, 423-25 (Mass. 
1878) (finding that shipper could not recover profits lost on contracts to make lumber into 
railroad ties even though it had informed railroad of the contracts at the time it made the 
contracts for shipment); Thomas, Badgley & W. Mfg. Co. v. Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co., 
22 N.W. 827 (Wis. 1885) (finding that shipper could not recover for loss of use of machine 
damaged during shipping because railroad was not informed of the machine’s use). 
 244.  Reed Lumber Co. v. Lewis, 10 So. 333, 334 (Ala. 1891). 
 245.  Id. 
 246.  Id. 
 247.  61 N.E. 561. 
 248.  Id. at 562-563. Although Blanchard v. Ely has been overlooked as an early case 
requiring that damages for breach of contact be foreseeable (see note 107), Griffin v. Colver 
was often cited in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries for that rule.  See, e.g., 
Hagen v. Rawle, 143 Ill. App. 543, 545 (Ill. App. Ct. 1908). 
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liabilities are to be assumed by a party contracting to deliver 
goods, it should appear that he understood the nature of the 
responsibility he was taking upon himself, and that his 
compensation should include some consideration for the 
responsibility assumed.  Furthermore, these cases intimate that 
the liability of the party for the extraordinary damages which 
might result from a breach of the contract to deliver should be so 
plainly understood as to render it one of the terms of the contract 
that, in case of a failure to deliver the goods, the person guilty of 
the breach would be responsible for such damages.  And the very 
reasonable observation has been made that, if parties desire to 
avail themselves of a claim to such damages, they should 
expressly stipulate for them in the contract itself.249 
This combines the rationale of the tacit agreement test with the assumption 
that the defendant would not expect that the plaintiff intended to use the 
goods in a profit-making endeavor. 
In 1891, the United States Supreme Court said:  “The authorities both 
in England and the United States are agreed that as a general rule, subject 
to certain well-established qualifications, the anticipated profits prevented 
by breach of a contract are not recoverable in the way of damages for such 
breach . . . .”250  Citing the 1880 edition of Sedgwick on Damages, the court 
listed three reasons this was so: 
(1) that in the greater number of cases such expected profits are 
too dependent upon numberous [sic], uncertain and changing 
contingencies to constitute a definite and trustworthy measure of 
actual damages; (2) because such loss of profits is ordinarily 
remote and not, as a matter of course, the direct and immediate 
result of the non-fulfilment of the contract; (3) and because most 
frequently the engagement to pay such loss of profits, in case of 
default in the performance, is not part of the contract itself, nor 
can it be implied from its nature and terms.251 
The first of these reasons we would express today by saying that the 
plaintiff failed to prove his damages with reasonable certainty.252  The 
second shows the courts’ unwillingness to assume that the breaching party 
should have expected that the other party had plans to use the goods and 
services in question to make a profit, and the third presages the Court’s 
adoption of the tacit agreement test. 
This idea that the breaching party would not expect the plaintiff to 
 
 249.  Id. at 563. 
 250.  Howard v. Stillwell & Bierce Mfg. Co., 139 U.S. 199, 205-06 (1891). 
 251.  Id. at 206. 
 252.  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 33, § 352 (1979). 
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have plans to earn profits on what it had expected to buy continued well 
into the twentieth century.  As late as 1934, Professor McCormick could 
write about “the rule which denies recovery for unusual consequences of a 
breach of contract, where knowledge of the risk is not brought home to the 
defendant” and go on to say that the among the most frequent of these 
“unusual consequences” was loss of profits on a contract to resell the goods 
contracted for.253  Professor Bauer went even further, saying that even 
though Williston’s treatise on contracts (the leading work on contracts of 
that era) said that consequential damages could be awarded if the defendant 
was on notice of special circumstances, there were few cases it cited in 
which the plaintiff recovered without evidence that the defendant intended 
to assume liability for the consequences of those special circumstances.254 
Even as McCormick wrote, however, things were beginning to 
change.  Courts were beginning to allow plaintiffs to recover consequential 
damages without showing they had put the defendant on notice they 
intended to earn a profit with the goods (or occasionally, services) 
contracted for.255  McCormick himself suggested that judges interpreted the 
contemplation requirement flexibly, finding the lost profits within the 
contemplation of the parties when they thought it fair to allow recovery of 
the lost profits and finding they were not contemplated when the court 
thought their recovery would be unfair.256 
The drafters of the first Restatement of Contracts (Professor Williston 
was the Reporter) took a position seemingly opposite to that of most of the 
case law when they said in a comment to section on the Hadley v. 
Baxendale rule: 
A seller or carrier of goods usually has reason to know that the 
buyer or shipper either has made or will probably make a contract 
for the sale of the goods at a reasonable profit.  Such 
circumstances are in the usual course of things.  He therefore has 
reason to foresee that his own failure to deliver the goods as 
agreed will prevent the plaintiff from making such a reasonable 
profit.257 
The Restatement also rejected categorically the tacit agreement test.258  
 
 253.  McCormick, supra note 2, at 505. 
 254.  Ralph S. Bauer, Consequential Damages in Contract, 80 U. PA. L. REV. 687, 696 
(1932). 
 255.  See, e.g., Bonhard v. Gindin, 142 A. 52, 55 (N.J. 1928) (allowing recovery of lost 
profits which plaintiff intended to make on resale of property without proof that defendant 
had actual knowledge of intent to resell) (citing Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 345 
(Ex. 1854)). 
 256.  McCormick, supra note 4, at 508. 
 257.  RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 330 cmt. c (1932). 
 258.  See id. cmt. a (“One who has committed a breach of contract is bound to pay 
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Perhaps more importantly, the Restatement expressed the Hadley test in 
terms of the defendant’s liability for those injuries that he “had reason to 
foresee” as a result of the breach.259  Although this is a subtle change from 
the language generally used before, it is an important one.  It implies that 
the plaintiff can recover if the defendant, at the time it made the contract, 
had reason to expect that the plaintiff would lose profits if the defendant 
breached.  The defendant did not have to be thinking about, or 
“contemplating” the loss of profits; he just had to be in a position where, if 
he had thought about the issue, he should have realized there was a good 
chance that a breach would lead to a loss of profits.  The Uniform 
Commercial Code took a similar position. A comment said that the 
standard was whether the seller “had reason to know” of the potential 
damages.260 
These developments contributed to a general relaxation of the 
foreseeability requirement that began about 1930.  The current attitude is 
reflected in cases such as Burnett & Doty Development Co. v. Phillips.261  
There, the California Court of Appeals held that the fact a builder 
personally added a completion date into a subcontract was enough to make 
it foreseeable that the builder would suffer lost profits when the 
subcontractor failed to complete its work on time.262  In Manouchehri v. 
Heim,263 the New Mexico Supreme Court allowed a physician to recover 
the profits he lost as a result of a defective x-ray machine.  The seller 
argued that these lost profits were not foreseeable, but the court rejected 
this argument, saying:  “[The defendant] knew his customer and knew how 
the x-ray machine was to be used.  Any reasonable person in his position 
would assume that a doctor using such a machine would charge more for its 
use than the cost of operation and would earn income from it.”264  
Similarly, when Virginia Polytechnic Institute (Virginia Tech) breached a 
contract to work with a private corporation to jointly develop new 
technology, it was foreseeable from the nature of the enterprise that the 
 
damages only for such injury as he had reason to foresee when he made the contract.  This 
does not mean, however, that the defendant must have had the resulting injury actually in 
contemplation or that he promised either impliedly or expressly to pay therefore in case of 
breach.”) 
 259.  Id. at § 330. 
 260.  U.C.C. § 2-715 (2015), cmt. 2 (internal quotations omitted). 
 261.  148 Cal. Rptr. 569 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978). 
 262.  See id. at 572-573 (holding that plaintiff was entitled to lost profits where 
defendant personally wrote the completion date into the contract and failed to complete 
work by that date). 
 263.  941 P.2d 978 (N.M. 1997). 
 264.  Id. at 983. 
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parties would receive profits from the licensing or sale of the technology.265 
A few jurisdictions, most notably New York, still use the tacit 
agreement test,266 and in those jurisdictions the Hadley principle is still an 
important limitation on a plaintiff’s ability to recover lost profits, though 
even in those jurisdictions the certainty requirement is much more 
important. 
This leaves open one question in the development of the reasonable 
certainty rule.  How did the courts transform the requirement that the lost 
profits be proven with absolute certainty to one that they be proven with 
“reasonable certainty?”  The language of Griffin v. Colver was ambiguous 
on this score.  In the second paragraph of the opinion, Judge Selden says 
that “[i]t is a well established rule of common law that the damages to be 
recovered for a breach of contract must be shown with certainty[.]”267  
Later in the opinion, in language that has been incorporated into many 
opinions in many jurisdictions, he says that the damages “must be certain, 
both in their nature and in respect to the cause from which they proceed.”268  
But here it is not clear that when he speaks of certainty he means absolute 
certainty rather than reasonable certainty because he contrasts “certain” 
with “speculative,” indicating that a reasonable estimate may be all that is 
required.269  More importantly, two paragraphs later, he says that “the law 
. . . uniformly adopts that mode of estimating the damages which is most 
definite and certain.”270  This clearly implies that some uncertainty is to be 
tolerated. 
Some twentieth century courts have said that Griffin stated a 
requirement of absolute certainty that later was transformed into the less 
demanding requirement of reasonable certainty.271  But the courts of 
Griffin’s time seem to have been stating the requirement as one of 
reasonable certainty as soon as they began relying on Griffin to allow the 
 
 265.  Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ. v. Interactive Return Serv., 595 S.E.2d 1, 7-8 
(Va. 2004). 
 266.  See, e.g., Kenford Co. v. County of Erie, 537 N.E.2d 176, 178-89 (N.Y. 1989) 
(noting that in determining whether damages had been within the contemplation of the 
parties, circumstances of the contract and to what extent the defendant consciously assumed 
liability may be considered); John R. Hudson, Stifft’s Jewelers v. Oliver: The Tacit 
Agreement Test—Arkansas Clings to a Dinosaur, 40 ARK. L. REV. 403 (1986) (describing 
the various states that have shown an inclination for applying the tacit agreement test). 
 267.  Griffin v. Colver, 16 N.Y. 489, 491 (N.Y. 1858). 
 268.  Id. at 495.   
 269.  See id. 
 270.  Id. 
 271.  See, e.g., TAS Distrib. Co. v. Cummins Engine Co., 491 F.23d 625, 631-32 (7th 
Cir. 2007) (relying on the opinion’s use of the word “certainty without qualification); 
Certain-Teed Prods. Corp. v. Goslee Roofing & Sheet Metal, Inc., 339 A.2d 302, 316 (Md. 
Ct. Spec. App. 1975). 
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recovery of lost profits.272  An 1883 opinion of the Minnesota Supreme 
Court cited Griffin for the proposition:  “To enable loss of profits to be 
shown on a question of damage, they should, for obvious consideration, be 
reasonably certain, otherwise any estimate of damages based upon them is 
conjecture.”273  A year earlier, the Iowa Supreme Court, though not citing 
Griffin, talked of tracing the loss “with reasonable certainty to the breach of 
the contract.”274  Similarly, Maryland’s highest court, after citing Griffin, 
said:  “the plaintiff must establish the quantum of his loss by evidence from 
which the jury will be able to estimate the extent of his injury, excluding all 
elements of injury as are incapable of being ascertained to a reasonable 
degree of certainty by the usual rules of evidence.”275 
VII. CONCLUSION 
It is impossible to overstate the importance of three now-forgotten 
New York opinions—Blanchard, Masterton, and Griffin.  They brought 
into American law the foundation for damages in commercial disputes: 
Lost profits may be recovered, but only if they are proven with reasonable 
certainty.  Law students may be tortured with the Court of the Exchequer’s 
opinion in Hadley v. Baxendale, and academics may write endless articles 
about whether the rule that case articulated is economically efficient,276 but 
in significant commercial litigation, it is the rule of Griffin v. Colver that 
determines the outcome. 
 
 
 272.  See, e.g., Cent. Coal & Coke Co. v. Hartman, 111 F. 96, 98 (8th Cir. 1901) (citing 
Griffin for the proposition that profits of a commercial enterprise generally cannot be 
recovered because they cannot be proven with reasonable certainty); Hunt v. Or. Pac. Ry. 
Co., 36 F. 481, 484 (D. Ore. 1888) (citing Griffin for requirement that damages be proven 
with reasonable certainty). 
 273.  Cushing v. Seymour, 15 N.W. 249, 250 (Minn. 1883). 
 274.  Alexander v. Bishop, 13 N.W. 714, 717 (Iowa 1882). 
 275.  Lanahan v. Weaver, 29 A. 1036, 1038 (Md. 1894). 
 276.  See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Principle of Hadley v. Baxendale, 80 CAL. 
L. REV. 563 (1992) (arguing that economic theories do not justify the principle in Hadley v. 
Baxendale).  
